Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-01-09-aggression-12 Last-Modified: 1996/06/05 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Nine [Page 794] 12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR A. Inception of the Plan. The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On that day - just a week before the invasion of Poland -- the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the USSR This Treaty (TC-25) contained two significant articles: "Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers." "Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two partners would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commission." (TC- 25) The Treaty was signed for the USSR by the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, and for the German Government by Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information (1834-PS). Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the USSR in the following words: "Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia -- a necessity for avoiding a two- front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia." (1834-PS) In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them to do so. That they did so regard it is evident from the fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in progress, they began to consider the pos- [Page 795] sibility of launching a war of aggression against the USSR In a speech to the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters at Munich in November 1943, Jodl admitted that: "Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East -- that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible." (L-172) At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the USSR as a political factor, and in the acquisition of lebesraum at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practicable. As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the Wirtschaft Rustug Amt, or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (Wi Rue Amt). General Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft of a work entitled "Basic Facts For a History of German War and Armaments Economy," which he prepared during the Summer of 1944 (235-PS). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at page 315 he has the [Page 796] following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940: "On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters concerning Russian War-Economy." (235-PS) This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the USSR Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service. Counterintelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter- Intelligence Service Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (1229-PS). This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared and outlined the line for the counterintelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations already underway. It provides: "The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached. "These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests -- especially on the Balkan -- with strong forces against Russian seizure. "For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply: [Page 797] "1. The respective total strength of the-German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings. "2. The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant. "3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary. "4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the antiaircaft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets. "5. Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, etc., it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic. "The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i. e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage. "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order of /signed/ Jodl." (1229-PS) Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the army's operational plans. This order was contained in a Top Secret directive from the Fuehrer's Headquarters No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (444- PS). The directive begins by saying that: "The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines." (444-PS) It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the USSR: "*** 5. Russia "Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of [Page 798] clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. "Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me." (444-PS) On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the USSR A report of this conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on all Barbarossa (1799- PS). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it occurred: "Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940. "The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Lenin "The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration. "The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible." "It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient." (1799-PS) [Page 799] B. Plan Barbarossa. By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army's operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces for Barbarossa -- Directive No. 21 -- was issued (446-PS). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the USSR was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to denote the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages in that directive-is the opening sentence: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa)." (446- PS) The directive continues: "Preparations requiring more time to start are -- if this has not yet been done -- to begin presently and are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941." "Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized." (446-PS) The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows: "V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in- Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions. "The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time." (446-PS) The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature. It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive. [Page 800] C. Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign- and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date: 7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces". (C-35) ("Ia" is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all: "II. Objectives of War Against Russia. d. To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: "1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea." (C-35) This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack. Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical: "In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations." (C-33) On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume, which was [Page 801] the code name for the North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in- Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant (872-PS). During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report out enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial operations: "The intended time period was discussed with a plan. 1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) 2nd " " " transfer now, Front -- Germany -- East from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only under difficulties.. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and Gibraltar.] "In industry the full capacity time-table is in force. No more camouflage. "From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the planned operation against England] can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable. "The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan. "C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ [Page 802] 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West. "Fuehrer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment." (872-PS) This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941 -- almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows: "Conclusions: "1. Barbarossa "a. The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad. "b. The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible. "c. Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw. "d. It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure). "e. The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita." (872-PS) As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the same line (874-PS). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their treacherous attack: [Page 803] "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 1941 DRAFT "Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT) "For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations. "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt. "K. J. W." [Initials of Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS) On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (446-PS), which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas" (447-PS). This detailed operational order, which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed "Area of Operations and Executive Power" and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks." This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b: "*** b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and [Page 804] in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS." (447-PS) The order then states that, in time, political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3: "c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited n the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer. "3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. "The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks. "a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task. "b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (447-PS) The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in Section I, paragraph 4: "4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rue Amt' with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt." (447- PS) The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the [Page 805] relations with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows: "III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland. 9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW." (447-PS) The document closes with a section regarding Sweden: "IV. Directives regarding Sweden. 12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR- transports against sabotage and attacks. "The Chief of the High Command Of the Armed Forces "signed: KEITEL" (447-PS) As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 (446-PS), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about 15 May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and wee forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document (C-170) which has been identified by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows: "Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about five weeks. All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order." (C-170) By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D- Day as 22 June more than seven weeks away. A "Top Secret" report of a conference with the Chief of the Section Landsverteidigung of the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab on 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs: [Page 806] "1. Timetable Barbarossa: The Fuehrer has decided: Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23-May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. "2. Proportion of actual strength n the plan Barbarossa: Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength. Sector Middle: Great German superiority. Sector South: Russian superiority." (873-PS) Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (C- 39) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as follows: "Top Military Secret "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op) "Fuehrer's Headquarters (no date) "Top Secret (Chefsache) Only through officer "21 copies 3rd copy Ob. d. m. I op.00845/41 Received 6 June Enclosures: -- "The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for 'Barbarossa'. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed. "Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces signed: Keitel" (C-39) The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is in tabular form with six [Page 807] columns headed from left to right at the top of each page -- Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, "Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (saetester Anhaltetermin)" (C-39). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: "Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: 'Dortmund'" (C-39). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: "Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (Schwerpunkt), concentration of armour and artillery must be reckoned with" (C-39). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW and provides as follows: "Invasion Day "H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours". (C-39) In the Remarks column it is stated that: "Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force." (C-39) The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces. On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941 8 days before "D-day" (C-78). This order, signed by Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows: "TOP SECRET Only by Officer "Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant "at Berchtesgaden 9th June 1941 "To the Fuehrer Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret "Top Secret "Re: Conference 'Barbarossa' "1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the Commanders of Army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank. "2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin. [Page 808] "3. Time Table. "a. 11.00 hrs "Silver Fox" "b. 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs Army Group South "c. 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs Lunch party for all participants in conference "d. From 15.30 hrs Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group "Center" in this order. Participants see enclosed list of participants. (list of names, etc. follows) "(signed) Schmundt Colonel of the General Staff and Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer".(C-78) There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the USSR Starting almost a full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the military figures -- Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. D. Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoilation of the USSR Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic. The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need was translated as a right, and they early began planning [Page 809] and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit. As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the Wi Rue Amt, received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the USSR, which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In November 19408 months before the attack Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation (235-PS). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these terms: "*** In November, 1940, the Chief of the Wi Rue together with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East. "By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of WiRue at the end of 1940. "The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks: "1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries. "2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other. "3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union. "4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil) . "5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union. "These points were concentrated in one big compilation 'War Economy of the Soviet Union' and illustrated with detailed maps, etc." "Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization. "For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, [Page 810] was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office, resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory." (2353- PS) By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows: "The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal. "Essential Points: "1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan. "2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe. "3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin. "4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps: a. Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods. b. Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complimentary districts. "5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term war economy inspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection. "6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of seizing raw materials and taking over all [Page 811] important concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences. (for example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum). "After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week. "Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia. "Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the end of next week. "(signed:) Hamann". (1317-PS) Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting. The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (447-PS). The order stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and political administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated his authority to the-Chief of the Wi Rue Amt (Thomas). (447 PS) The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain the organizational setup of Economic Staff Oldenburg. (Oldenburg was the code name given to this economic counterpart of Barbarossa.) Section I of the report of this conference (1157-PS) deals with the general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had developed. The report begins: [Page 812] "Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29 April 1941 I. Welcome "Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action. "Barbarossa -- Oldenburg "As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration. "The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chef Wi Rue Amt). "Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties under the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert. "His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are: 5 economic inspectorates 23 economic commands 12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands. "These offices are used in the military rear area; the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group. an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory. "A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaisance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production. "In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the [Page 813] liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the- troops from the country's resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation. "While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality. "The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc. "This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into three large groups, i.e. "Group H dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization. "Group L which concerns itself with all questions of feed and agriculture, and "Group W which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw-materials and suppliers; further questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation. "Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken." (1157-PS) The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel and staffing problems, and similar details. These documents portray the calculated method with which the -Nazi conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage an attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The story [Page 814] of how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.) E. Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression. As has already been indicated, and as will be later more fully developed, there were both economic and political motives for the action of the Nazi conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. The economic aspects have been discussed. Equally elaborate planning was engaged in by the Nazi conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim of their aggression. That political aim may be described as the elimination of the USSR as a powerful political factor in Europe, and the acquisition of Lebensraum. For the accomplishment of these purposes the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent Rosenberg. As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his staff!, prepared a memorandum on the USSR (1017-PS). This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the USSR which would result in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. The memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This memorandum begins: "Subject: The USSR "Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come into being through the annexation of states of a related or even of an essentially alien character. "A military conflict with the USSR will result in an extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section of the USSR It is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of the USSR The occupation of these areas would then present not so many military as administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question: "Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to be attained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations. "If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one may conclude that: "1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions; [Page 815] "2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual -sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain; "3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this necessitates and the great directives for the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all together in one place. "It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the area to be occupied which are essential to Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been assured. "Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia's population the following national or geographical units: "a. Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre. "b. White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital. "c. Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. "d. The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre. "e. The Don area with Rostov as its capital. "f. The area of the Caucasus. "g. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan." (1017- PS) The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or geographical units thus listed in some detail. At the end of the paper the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly outlines his plan in these terms: "The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points briefly outlined here: "1. The creation of a central department for the occupied areas of the USSR, to be confined more or less to wartime. "Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would be the task of this department "a. To issue binding political instructions to the separate administration area, having in mind the situation existing at the time and the goal which is to be achieved. "b. To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the occupied areas. "c. To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for instance, those of finance and [Page 816] funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and food; "2. The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the separate administration area, grouped together by race or by reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them. "As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent it. "The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of the USSR would require different treatment from that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe. "2.4.41" (1017-PS) It is evident that the "presently envisaged" administration operating on a purely economic basis, to which this memorandum objects, was the Economic Staff Oldenburg which was set up under Goering and Thomas. Rosenberg's statement of the political purpose of the invasion and his analysis of methods for achieving it apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Fuehrer Order dated 20 April 1941 he was named "Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East- European Region". This order is part of a correspondence file regarding Rosenberg's appointment (865-PS). Hitler's order reads as follows: "I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. "An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. [Page 817] "The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum. "Fuehrer's Headquarters 20 April 1941. (signed) Adolf Hitler "Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery (signed) Dr. Lammers" This particular copy of the Fuehrer's Order was enclosed in a letter which Dr. Lammers wrote to Keitel requesting cooperation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a Deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows: "The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery "Berlin W8 21st April 1941 VossStrasse 6 At present Fuehrer Headquarters, mail without exception to be sent to the Berlin address. "To: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel "Personal. By courier "My dear General Field Marshal, "Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister of Economics and you, yourself. "Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's [Page 818] wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him. "It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office, with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter. "I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter. "Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, Dr. Lammers." (865-PS) Keitel wrote Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of his compliance with the request: "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. "25 April 1941 "Most Secret "By courier "To: "The Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers "Personal "Dear Reich Minister. "I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy. "Heil Hitler "Yours very sincerely, "K. 25/4" (865-PS) Keitel also wrote Rosenberg, telling of his compliance with Lammers' request: [Page 819] "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 25th April 1941 "Most Secret "By courier "To: "Reichsleiter Rosenberg "Personal. "Dear Reichsleiter, "The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only. "Heil Hitler "Yours very sincerely, "K. 25/4" (865-PS) Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg began building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although Rosenberg's files, which were captured intact, were crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient. All the documents now discussed were found in Rosenberg's files. In a memorandum dated 8 May 1941, entitled "General Instructions for all Reichcommissars in the occupied Eastern Territories", Rosenberg gives instructions to his chief henchmen and outlines clearly the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the English translation the following remarks appear: "The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from the Great Russian (grossrussisch) pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against [Page 820] Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader's political testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever. "Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichs- Commissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commissariat Eastland (Ostland) including White-Ruthenia will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in the following instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for all Reich Commissars." (1030-PS) The fifth paragraph presents an interesting rationalization of a contemplated robbery: "The German people has achieved, in the course of centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real estate property was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of compensation and restitution of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich Commissariat." (1030-PS) "An Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries [Page 821] and White Russia" (1029-PS) is typical of the directives issued to each of the appointed commissioners. This order is amazingly frank in outlining the intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their aggression. It begins: "All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been in close relationship with the German people. A 700 year old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a European direction, and has added this region to the living space of Greater Germany. "The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White Russia [last words added in pencil] must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany. "For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of germanizing or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly germanized to the extent of 50o by Danish, German and Swedish blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller than in Esthonia. In this country stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanization (on the East Prussian border)." ******* "The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly Germanized land, is to be established as a mighty, German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a [Page 822] later emigration to all those who have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilization from Bolshevism. For the rest, the solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on these lines." (1029-PS) These two directives are sufficiently typical of the lot to show the extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby. They are reinforced by a later report of Rosenberg's. On 28 June 1941, less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April (1039-PS). This report makes disclosures concerning the number of conspirators who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all the ministries and offices of both the State and the Party were involved in this operation. The report was found in Rosenberg's files and, although it is rather long, it is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups and organizations to justify quotation in full: "Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions "Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20.4.1941 a conference with the Chief of the OKW [Armed Forces High Command] took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the Chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (OK-stelung) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (Abkommandierung) by command of the Chief of the OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaoration with officials of my office. "A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office [Page 823] could in no way deal with any representatives of people of the East-European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the Military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications. "Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme Commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done. "Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff (Wirtshaftsfuehrungsstab) East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I am in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economies, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of [Page 824] labor unions, construction etc.). After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the' latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishe's for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners. "The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department 'Enlightenment and Press' .(Aufklaerung und Presse) and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day. "Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (Gebiet) Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Maingovernment. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is the [Page 825] minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW. "In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader (Reichsaerztefuehrer) Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service. "Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present. "Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader (Korpsfuehrer) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter), who has instructed the commander of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in connection with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic [Page 826] leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions. "Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer [SS Lt Gen] Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision. "Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements. "The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine, influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in [Page 827] the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats. "As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and the State. I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General and Chief commissariats more than 900 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces -- not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefore all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree. "The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantial work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have been scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all those, with the [Page 828] exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic-political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. A department of 'Law, Finance, and Administration' has been taken over by Regierungspraesident Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department 'Enlightenment and Press'. It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef) for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible. "Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide." (1039-PS) (As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff, it will be shown how all this planning and preparation for the elimination of the USSR as a political factor were actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection as a European Power.) Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the USSR In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: "I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers." This announcement told the world that the die had been cast; that the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously developed since then had now been brought to fruition. The Nazi conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it. [Page 829] F. The Motives for the Attack. It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany bound by solemn covenant not to attack the USSR, but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward the territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of "Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy" (2353-PS), that insofar as the German-Soviet trade agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end. Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw material being thus delivered was considered essential to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about maintaining their obligations. At page 315 of his book Thomas says: "Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way. "The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains." (2353- PS) Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more forcefully: "In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the [Page 830] equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack." (2353-PS) Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty obligations with Germany, but she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. A file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command, covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack (C- 170), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be sufficient to quote a few entries, which include reports from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. Entry 165 reads: "165 A 22,29 4 June "Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany- Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany." (C-170) Entry 167 reads: "167 A 22.53 6 June "Ambassador in Moscow reports *** Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly -- as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good." ( C-l 70) Entry 169 also reiterates this point: "169 A 22.65 7 June "From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow ***. All observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing." (C-170) The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. No doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the USSR All of them, however, appear to [Page 831] blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the USSR This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative, "Drang Nach Osten," had been a cardinal principle of the Party almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German ambition, and acquisition of Lebensraum. Economically, it offered opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent. As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in Mein Kampf, where he stated? at page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English edition: "There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special examination the relation of Germany to Russia: "1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs; and "2. This question is also the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think clearly and to act correctly." Again, at page 654 of the same edition: "And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil policy of the future. "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states." The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes, previously discussed, of the organization which Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a speech which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of the East, he restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with [Page 831] the economic goal (1058-PS). A short extract from that speech reads as follows: "The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from these of the Western people. The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. An historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today." (1058- PS) As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Britain had served further to strengthen them in their belief in the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe. The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the previous discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory to be occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable. If any doubt existed that at least one of [Page 833] the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine, regardless of the consequences to the Russian people which such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum showing clear and conscious recognition by the Nazis that their plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people. (2718-PS) On 20 June 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum along a similar line, in which he stated that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's present conception of the German economic- policy concerning raw materials (1456-PS). This policy expressed the theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This memorandum reads, in part: "The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel: "1. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical endeavors. It is impossible to try and manufacture everything we lack, by synthetic procedures, or other measures. For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them. "At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks respectively to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances." (1456-PS) On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to an end. In view of the solemn pledge of non-aggression; the base and sinister motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chap- [Page 834] ter has never been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators' unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. ----------------------------- LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 (a). Vol. I, Pg. 5 International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 6; V. Vol. I, Pg. 27,29 [Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.] *444-PS; Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer's Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116) . Vol. III, Pg. 403 [Page 835] *446-PS; Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31) . Vol. III, Pg. 407 *447-PS; Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for special areas. (USA 135) . Vol. III, Pg. 409 *864-PS; Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on conference between Hitler and Chief OKW concerning future relations of Poland to Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609) . Vol. III, Pg. 619 *865-PS; Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg and Lammers, April 1941, concerning appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW representatives with Rosenberg. (USA 143) . Vol. III, Pg. 621 *872-PS; Memorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case "Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume" (African operation). (USA 134) . Vol. III, Pg. 626 *873-PS; Top secret memorandum of discussion with the Chief "L", 30 April 1941, about the invasion of Russia. (USA 137) . Vol. III, Pg. 633 874-PS; Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J, and W, 9 March 1941, concerning Deception measures. . Vol. III, Pg. 634 876-PS; Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941, concerning Deception of the enemy. . Vol. III, Pg. 635 886-PS; Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on courts martial and treatment of enemy civilians in the district "Barbarossa", signed by Keitel for Hitler, and initialled by Jodl. . Vol. III, Pg. 637 [Page 836] *1017-PS; Memorandum entitled "Memorial No. 1 regarding USSR", 2 April 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 142) . Vol. III, Pg. 674 *1019-PS; Appendix to Memorandum No. 2. Recommendation as to the personnel for the Reich Commissariats in the East and for the Political Central Office in Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823) . Vol. III, Pg. 681 *1029-PS; Paper entitled "Instructions for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic States", 8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 145) . Vol. III, Pg. 690 *1030-PS; General instructions for all Reich Commissars in the Occupied Eastern Territories, 8 May 1941, found in Rosenberg file. (USA 144) . Vol. III, Pg. 692 1034-PS; Minutes of discussion concerning Construction and Administration, 22 June 1941. . Vol. III, Pg. 693 *1039-PS; Report concerning preparatory work regarding problems in Eastern Territories, 28 June 1941, found in Rosenberg's "Russia File". (USA 146) . Vol. III, Pg. 695 *1058-PS; Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by Rosenberg before people most intimately concerned with Eastern Problem, found in his "Russia File". (USA 147) . Vol. III, Pg. 716 1156-PS; Report to Goering from Chief of Office for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 March 1941. . Vol. III, Pg. 808 [Page 837] *1157-PS; Report on conference, 29 April 1941, concerning top secret plan for Economic exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg Plan). (USA 141) . Vol. III, Pg. 811 *1229-PS; OKW Directive to the German Intelligence Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6 September 1940. (USA 130) . Vol. III, Pg. 849 1316-PS; Top secret note for files on conference of 21 March 1941 concerning employment of Quartermaster General. . Vol. III, Pg.908 *1317-PS; Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a discussion of the economic exploitation of Russia, presided over by General Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140) . Vol. III, Pg. 911 *1456-PS; Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel consulted about resources of USSR. (USA 148) . Vol. IV, Pg. 21 *1517-PS; Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning discussion with the Fuehrer, 114 February 1941. (USA 824) . Vol. IV, Pg. 55 *1799-PS; Annex 1 to report of Chief of General Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, concerning planned operation in the East. (USA 131) . Vol. IV, Pg. 374 *1834-PS; Report on conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) . Vol. IV, Pg. 469 *2353-PS; Extracts from General Thomas' Basic Facts for History of German War and Armament Economy. (USA 35) . Vol. IV, Pg. 1071 *2718-PS; Memorandum "About the result of today's discussion with State Secretaries about Barbarossa", 2 May 1941. (USA 32) . Vol. V, Pg. 378 3014-PS; Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring, former German military attache in Moscow, concerning planning for the attack on the USSR in early August 1940.; Vol. V, Pg. 734 [Page 838] 3031-PS; Affidavit of General Warlimont, 121 January 1945, stating that first directive for campaign against USSR was issued in August 1940. . Vol. V, Pg. 740 3032-PS; Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, 121 January 1945, stating that the projected campaign against USSR was first made known to him at conference with Jodl, 29 July 1940. . Vol. V, Pg. 741 *3054-PS; "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167). . Vol. V, Pg. 801 3579-PS; Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the status of deliveries under German-Russian economic agreement, 28 September 1940. . Vol. VI, Pg. 276 *C-33; Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning operation "Barbarossa" and "Marita". (USA 133) . Vol. VI, Pg. 846 *C-35; Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132) . Vol. VI, Pg. 846 C-37; References to operation "Barbarossa"' in the German Naval War Diary, June 1941. . Vol. VI, Pg. 854 *C-38; Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting decision on action against enemy submarines and Order to attack Soviet submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) . Vol. VI, Pg. 855 *C-39; Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138) . Vol. VI, Pg. 857 *C-50; Covering letters and Order of 13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162) . Vol. VI, Pg. 871 [Page 839] C-51; Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, for destruction of all copies of Order of 18 May 1941 (document C-50) without affecting its validity. . Vol. VI, Pg. 875 C-53; Order signed by Keitel, 20 September 1940, concerning Military Missions to Rumania. . Vol. VI, Pg.877 C-54; Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning military activities in Rumania. . Vol. VI, Pg. 877 *C-77; Memorandum from Chief of High Command to Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146) . Vol. VI, Pg. 908 *C-78; Schmundt's Order of 9 June 1941, convening conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA 139) . Vol. VI, Pg. 909 C-150; Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu, 18 June 1941. . Vol. VI, Pg. 963 *C-170; File of Russo-German relations found in OKM files covering the period 25 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) . Vol. VI, Pg. 977 *L-172; "The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War", a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34) . Vol. VII, Pg. 920 *TC-25; Non-aggression Treaty between Germany and USSR and announcement of 25 September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 375 Statement XIV; Hungarian Relations with Germany Before and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. Statement XV; Why Hungary Went to War Against the Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., Nurnberg, 3 May 1946. . Vol. VIII, Pg. 767
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