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                          Judgment
                           of the
               International Military Tribunal
                           For The
             Trial of German Major War Criminals

                           London
               His Majesty's Stationery Office
                            1951
                                                            
                                                  [Page 132]
                                                            
DISSENTING OPINION of the Soviet Member of the International
Military Tribunal, Major General Jurisprudence I.T.
Nikitchenko on the Judgment concerning defendants Schacht,
von Papen, Fritzsche and Hess and the accused organisations
Reichscabinet, General Staff, and OKW.

The Tribunal decided:

     a) To acquit the Defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz
     von Papen and Hans Fritzsche;
     
     b) To sentence the defendant Rudolf Hess to life
     imprisonment;
     
     c) Not to declare criminal the following
     organisations: the Reichscabinet, General Staff,
     and OKW.

In this respect I can not agree with the decision adopted by
the Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the
case and is based on incorrect conclusions.

I. The unfounded acquittal of defendant Schacht.

The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of
Schacht, confirms the following facts:

(a) Schacht established contact with Goering in December,
1930, and with Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He
subsequently established contact between the leadership of
the Nazi Party and the foremost representatives of the
German industrial and financial circles. This, in
particular, is confirmed by the testimony of Witness
Severing (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23rd May, 1946; US-
615).

(b) In July, 1932 Schacht demanded that von Papen resign his
post as Reich Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is
confirmed by von Papen's testimony at the preliminary
interrogation and by Schacht's own testimony in Court
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2nd May, 1946).

(c) In November, 1932, Schacht collected signatures of
German industrialists urging them to come out for Hitler's
appointment as Reich Chancellor. On 12th November, 1932
Schacht wrote to Hitler:

     "I have no doubt that the way we are directing the
     course of events can only lead to your appointment
     as Reich Chancellor. We are trying to secure a
     large number of signatures among the industrial
     circles to ensure your appointment to this post."
     (EC-456, US-773; PS-3901, US-837)

(d) In February, 1933, Schacht organized the financing of
the pre-election campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and
demanded at the conference of Hitler and Goering with the
industrialists that the latter provide three million marks
(D-203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had pointed out
the necessity for providing the Nazi leaders with this sum
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3rd May, 1946), while the
defendant Funk and the former member of the management of
"I. G. Farbenindustrie" Schnitzler, who were present at this
conference, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was the
initiator of the financing of the pre-election campaign
(Transcript, 4th July, 1946; EC-439, US-618).

(e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted
in his public statements that he asked for the support in
the elections of both the Nazi Party and of Hitler (US-615;
Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2nd May, 1946).

On 29th August, 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler:

     "No matter where my activities lead me in the near
     future, even if some day you see me imprisoned in
     a fortress, you can always depend on me as your
     loyal aide" (EC-457, US-619).

                                                  [Page 133]
                                                            
Thus, Schacht consciously and deliberately supported the
Nazi Party and actively aided in the seizure of power in
Germany by the Fascists. Even prior to his appointment as
Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and immediately after the
seizure of power by the Nazis Schacht led in planning and
developing the German armaments, as follows:

(a) On 17th March, 1933, Schacht was appointed President of
the Reichsbank (PS-3021, US-ll), and as he himself stated in
a speech before his Reichsbank colleagues on 21st March,
1938, the Reichsbank under his management was "none other
than a National Socialist institution" (Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 3rd May, 1946).

(b) In August, 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of
Economy (PS-3021, US-ll). His Ministry "was given the task
of carrying out the economic preparation for war" (EC-128,
US-623). A special decree granted Schacht, in his capacity
of Reich Minister of Economy, unlimited authority in the
field of economy ("Reichsgesetzblatt" for 1934, Part I, p.
565).

(c) Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon
the execution of the "new program" developed by him
("Reichsgesetzblatt",  1934, Part I, p. 826), and, as
Schacht himself noted in his speech of 29th November, 1938,
this organisation played a tremendous part in the course of
Germany's rearmament (EC-611, US-62).

(d) For the purpose of the most effective execution of this
"new program" Schacht used the property and means of those
political enemies of the Nazi regime, who either became the
victims of terror or were forced to emigrate (Schacht's note
to Hitler of 3rd May, 1939; PS-1168, US-137).

Schacht used swindler's tactics and coercion in an effort to
acquire raw material and foreign currency for armaments
(Affidavit of Vice-President of the Reichsbank, Puhl EC-437,
US-624).

(e) During the first days of his association with the
Reichsbank, Schacht issued a series of decrees (27th
October, 1933, 23rd March, 1934, 19th February, 1935), which
in the long run helped realize the broad program of the
financing of armaments, developed by him, and with the aid
of which, as he testified, he "had found the way to finance
the rearmament program.

The Unfounded Acquittal of defendant Schacht

In his speech in Leipzig on 4th March, 1935, Schacht, while
summing up his preceding economic and financial activities,
announced "..everything that I say and do has the Fuehrer's
full agreement and I shall not do or say anything which is
not approved by the Fuehrer" (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
3rd May, 1946).

Having become the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy,
Schacht unified under himself the leadership of the entire
German economy and through his efforts the establishment of
the Hitlerite war machine was accomplished.

(a) The secret law of 21st May, 1935, which appointed
Schacht the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states
as follows: "The task of the Plenipotentiary General for War
Economy is to place all the economic resources in the
service of warfare. The Plenipotentiary General for War
Economy within the framework of his functions is given the
right to issue legal orders, deviating from the existing
laws. He is the responsible head for financing wars through
the Reich Ministry and the Reichsbank" (PS-2261, US-24).

(b) Schacht financed German armaments through the Mefo
system of promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on
a national scale that has no precedent, and the success of
which was dependent upon the realization of the aggressive
plans of the Hitlerites. It was because of this that Schacht
set 1942 as the date when the Mefo notes were to mature, and
he pointed

                                                  [Page 134]
                                                            
out in his speech of 29th November, 1938 the relation
between "the daring credit policy" of the Reichsbank and the
aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy (EC-611, US-622).

(c) Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht
carefully developed and carried out a broad program of
economic mobilization which allowed the Hitlerite leaders to
wage war at any time considered most favorable. In
particular, from the report of Schacht's deputy, Wohltat,
"the preparation for mobilization carried out by the
Plenipotentiary for War Economy" shows that Schacht provided
to the last detail for the system of exploitation of the
German economy in war time, all the way from the utilization
of industrial enterprises, of raw material resources and
manpower down to the distribution of 80,000,000 ration cards
(EC-258, US-625). It is significant that this report was
drawn up a month after Hitler's statement at the conference
of 5th November, 1937, at which Hitler set forth this
concrete plan of aggression (PS-386, US-25).

Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January,
1937: "I worked out the preparation for war in accordance
with the principle that the plan of our war economy must be
built in peace time in such a way that there will be no
necessity for any reorganisation in case of war". Schacht
confirmed his statement in court (Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 2nd May, 1946).

Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for
war.

(d) The former Minister of War von Blomberg testified that:
"Schacht was fully cognizant of the plans for development
and increase of the German Armed Forces, since he was
constantly informed ..of all the financing necessary for the
development of the German armed forces" (US-838).

On 31st August, 1936, von Blomberg informed Schacht that:
"The establishment of all the Air Force units must be
completed by 1st April, 1937, and therefore large
expenditures must be entailed in 1936 . . ." (PS-1301, US-
123).

In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military
exercises in Godesberg (EC-174).

(e) In his memorandum to Hitler on 3rd May, 1935, entitled
the "Financing of Rearmament", Schacht wrote: "A speedy
fulfillment of the program for rearmament on a mass scale is
the basis of German policy, and, therefore, everything else
must be subordinate to this task; the completion of this
task, the achievement of this purpose must meet no obstacles
. . ." (PS-1168, US-37).

In his speech on 29th November, 1938, Schacht announced that
Reichsbank's credit policy made it possible for Germany to
create an "unsurpassed machine, and, in turn, this war
machine made possible the realization of the aims of our
policy" (EC-611, US-622).

One must exclude the supposition that Schacht was not
informed as to what purposes these weapons were to serve
since he could not but take into consideration their
unprecedented scale and an obvious preference for offensive
types of weapons (heavy tanks, bombers, and so on). Besides,
Schacht knew perfectly well that not a single country
intended to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons to do
so.

(a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his
direction to back Germany's territorial demands which grew
in proportion to the increase in armaments.

                                                  [Page 135]

Schacht testified in Court that "at first he confined
himself (in his demands) to the colonies which had once
belonged to Germany" (Transcript, Morning Session, 3rd May,
1946).

In September, 1934, during his talk with the American
Ambassador Dodd, Schacht pointed out that he desired
annexation if possible without war, but through war, if the
United States would stay out of it (EC-461, US-58).

In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Fuller:
"Colonies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we
shall acquire them through negotiations; if not, we shall
seize them." (EC-450, US-629)

Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon
Czechoslovakia was "in some measure the result and the fruit
of his labor" (Transcript, Morning Session, 3rd May, 1946).

(b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of
private and State property of the countries which became
victims of Hitlerite aggressions.

The minutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff
on 11th March, 1938, in which Schacht participated, state
that those present were given Hitler's latest directives
about the invasion of Austria. Further, the minutes state:
"After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was decided
that ..all the financial accounting will be made in
Reichsmarks at the rate of exchange: two schillings for one
Reichsmark" (EC-421, US-645).

Schacht admitted in Court that he personally was in charge
of the seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the
occupation of Czechoslovakia (Transcript, Morning Session,
3rd May, 1946).

(c) At the beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his
services for negotiations with the United States in regard
to the discontinuance of aid to England and he informed
Goering of his offer (PS-3700; US-780).

(d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate
Hitler publicly after the signing of armistice with France,
although Schacht, better than anyone else, understood the
usurpatory nature of the armistice (German Documentary Film,
US-635).

(e) In his letter to Funk on 17th October, 1941, Schacht
suggested a more effective exploitation of occupied
territory. In this case, too, Schacht acted on his own
initiative (EC-504; US-830).

Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews:

(a) He testified in Court that he "agreed to the policy of
the persecution of the Jews as a matter of principle
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2nd May, 1946) although, he
stated, "to a certain extent" it was a matter of conscience
which, however, "was not serious enough to bring about a
break" between him and the Nazis (Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 2nd May, 1946; US-616).

(b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a
series of decrees, in accordance with which the property of
the Jews in Germany was subject to plunder with impunity (US-
832; US-616). Schacht confirmed in Court the fact that he
had signed a series of anti-Semitic decrees (Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 2nd May, 1946).

As to the reasons for Schacht's resignation from the post of
the Minister of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for
War Economy in November, 1937, and also from the post of the
President of the Reichsbank on 20th November, 1939, and
finally from the post of he Minister without Portfolio in
January, 1943, the evidence submitted establishes the
following:

(a) The reason is not Schacht's disagreement with the
economic preparation for aggressive wars.

                                                  [Page 136]

Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the
post of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht
wrote to Goering: "..I also don't consider that my opinion
can differ from yours on economic policy . . ." (EC-497, US-
775).

In his reply Goering states:

".. You promised me your support and collaboration .... You
have repeated this promise many times, even after
differences of opinion began to creep up between us." (EC-
493, US-642).

Schacht testified in Court that Goering and he only
"differed in matters of procedure" (Transcript, Morning
Session, 3rd May, 1946).

In the preliminary examination Goering testified that
Schacht's leaving the Reichsbank "had no relation to the
program of rearmament" (US-648).

The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Puhl, confirmed that
Schacht's resignation from the Reichsbank can be explained
by "his desire to extricate himself from a dangerous
situation" which developed as the result of Schacht's own
crooked financial operations (EC-438, US-646).

(b) The reason is not Schacht's disapproval of mass terror
conducted by the Hitlerites.

The witness for the Defense, Gisevius, testified that he
constantly informed Schacht of the criminal actions of the
Gestapo, created by Goering, and that nevertheless, right up
to the end of 1936, Schacht looked for "Goering's support"
(Transcript, Morning Session, 24th April, 1946).

In his letter to von Blomberg on 124th February, 1935,
Schacht suggested that the Gestapo apply "more cautious
methods" since the open terror of the Gestapo "hinders the
objectives of the armament" (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
2nd May, 1946).

On 30th January, 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party
insignia by Hitler (EC-500; Transcript, Afternoon Session,
2nd May, 1946). As stated in an official German publication,
"he was able to be of greater help to the Party than if he
were actually a member of the Party" (EC-460, US-617).

Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other
Germans, the inevitability of the failure of the Hitlerite
regime, did Schacht establish contact with the opposition
circles, however, doing nothing to help depose this regime.
Therefore, it was not by chance that having found out these
connections of Schacht, Hitler still spared Schacht's life.

It is thus indisputably established that:

(1) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the
Nazis;

(2) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated
with Hitler;

(3) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for
the creation of the Hitlerite military machine;

(4) Schacht prepared Germany's economy for the waging of
aggressive wars;

(5) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and in
the plunder of territories occupied by the Germans.

Therefore, Schacht's leading part in the preparation and
execution of the common criminal plan is proved.

The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction
with the evidence in possession of the Tribunal.

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