Archive/File: people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-006 
Last-Modified: 1999/05/28

Session No. 6

1 Iyar 5721 (17 April 1961)

Presiding Judge: I declare the sixth Session of the trial
open. The Court delivers the following decision which is:

Decision No. 3

After the reading of the indictment, Dr. Servatius, Counsel
for the Accused, raised two preliminary objections: the
first regarding the disqualification of the judge sitting in
judgment in this case, and the second regarding the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court to consider the charges contained
in the indictment.

We shall deal with these arguments in the order of
presentation, and shall give our reasons as far as the first
objection is concerned. In regard to the second we shall
only announce our conclusion at this stage without giving
our reasons for the time being.

With regard to the argument of disqualification, Dr.
Servatius said that the Accused was apprehensive lest the
judges should not be able to try this case without bias. The
fear is expressed not against any of the judges in
particular but against all three, on the grounds that they
are sons of the Jewish people and citizens of the State of
Israel. There are grounds for apprehension, so Counsel
argues, that the recollection of the Holocaust in which
millions of their people were destroyed, that Holocaust
which constitutes the background to the crimes attributed in
the indictment to the Accused, will adversely affect the
impartiality of the judges and their ability to do justice.
He also requested each of the Judges to ask himself whether
his personal suffering or that of members of his family in
the years of the Holocaust affect his ability to judge the
Accused in this case.

To these arguments we reply: The subject of the charges in
this case is the responsibility of the Accused for the acts
described in the indictment. In the examination of this
question it will not be difficult for us to maintain the
guarantees ensured to the Accused in any case conducted
according to our criminal law procedure, namely that every
man is deemed to be innocent and that his case must be tried
only on the basis of the evidence brought before the Court.
Those charged with the task of judging are professional
judges accustomed to weighing evidence and they will be
carrying out their task under the critical gaze of the
public; learned and experienced lawyers are defending the
Accused.

As for the Accused's fear concerning the background against
which this trial will be heard we can only repeat the
principles which apply to every judicial system worthy of
the name; that indeed while on the bench a judge does not
cease to be flesh and blood, possessed of emotions and
impulses. However he is required by law to subdue these
emotions and impulses, for otherwise a judge will never be
fit to consider a criminal charge which arouses feelings of
revulsion, such as treason, murder or any other grave crime.
It is true that the memory of the Holocaust shocks every Jew
to the depth of his being, but when this case is brought
before us we are obliged to overcome these emotions while
sitting in judgment. This duty we shall fulfil.

After considering the arguments of learned Counsel for the
Defence, this Court and each one of its judges regards
itself as competent to try this case.

Dr. Servatius' objections to the jurisdiction of this Court
were divided into two sections; firstly in regard to the
circumstances in which the Accused was brought here from
abroad, and secondly in regard to the validity of the Nazis
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950 under
which the Accused has been charged.

In respect of these objections extensive oral and written
arguments have been submitted by both sides. We should like
to express our appreciation to Defence Counsel and to the
Attorney General for the high level of their arguments and
for the manner of their presentation.

After full considerations of these arguments we have come to
the conclusion that Defence Counsel's objections should be
dismissed. The source of our authority to deal with this
case is to be found in the above-mentioned law, and we do
not believe that there is sufficient basis, in international
law either, for Defence Counsel's objections relating to the
application of the law, from the point of view of both place
and time.

Similarly we dismiss Defence Counsel's argument on the
subject of "Act of State," to the extent that they are
directed against the Court's jurisdiction.

As for the arguments over the circumstances under which the
Accused was brought to the State of Israel, in view of the
fact that we have found that the Court has jurisdiction to
try the Accused, the manner in which he was brought within
the jurisdiction of this Court has no relevance according to
law, neither has the fact whether he was apprehended abroad
by emissaries of the governing authorities of the State of
Israel or not. Accordingly there is no necessity to hear the
evidence of the witnesses Tohar and Shimoni who were
summoned here at the request of Defence Counsel.

We shall set out the detailed reasoning of our decision, so
far as it touches upon the jurisdiction of the Court, in the
judgment of the Court.

[To the Accused] Did you hear the indictment on the opening
day of the trial?

Accused: Yes.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty on the first
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the second
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the third
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the fourth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the fifth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the sixth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
seventh count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty on the eighth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the ninth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the tenth
count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
eleventh count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
twelfth count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
thirteenth count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
fourteenth count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: Are you guilty or not guilty, on the
fifteenth count?

Accused In the sense of the indictment, no.

Presiding Judge: I now read out my decision which is
decision No. 4

Decision No. 4

I decide that the opening speech of the Attorney General
shall be recorded by the stenographers, as laid down in my
decision regarding the recording of the proceedings, dated
13 Nissan 5721 - 30 March 1961.

Presiding Judge: Mr. Attorney General, pray proceed.

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