Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression High-ranking military officers paid tribute to Schacht's con-
[Page 360]
trivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. An article
written for the "Military Weekly Gazette" in January 1937
stated:
"The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht
today as one of the men who have done imperishable
things for it and its development in accordance with
directions from the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. The
defense force owes it to Schachts skill and great
ability that in defiance of all currency difficulties
it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to its
present strength from an army of 100,000 men."
After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi
conspirators redoubled their efforts to prepare Germany for
a major war. The Four Year Plan was proclaimed by Hitler in
his address at the Nurnberg Party Convention on 9 September
1936. It was given a statutory foundation by the decree
concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan dated 18
October 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 887.). By this decree
Goering was put in charge of the plan. He was authorized to
enact any legal and administrative measures deemed necessary
by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue
orders and instructions to all government agencies,
including the highest Reich authorities. The purpose of the
plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete self-
sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor fuel,
rubber, textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to
intensify preparations for war. The development of synthetic
products was greatly accelerated despite their high costs.
Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi
conspirators required foreign exchange to finance propaganda
and espionage activities abroad. Thus, in a speech on 1
November 1937 before the Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas
stated:
"If you consider that one will need during the war
considerable means in order to organize the necessary
propaganda, in order to pay for the espionage service,
and for similar purposes, then one should be clear that
our internal Mark would be of no use therefore, and
that Foreign Exchange will be needed." (EC-14)
This need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by virtue
of the espionage and propaganda services rendered free of
charge to the Nazi state by leading German industrial
concerns. A memorandum dated at Essen on 12 October 1935,
which was found in the files of the Krupp company, contains
the subheading: "Concerns:-distribution official propaganda
literature abroad with help of our foreign connections." I
goes on to say that on the morning of October 11 the
district representative of the Ribben-
[Page 361]
trop Private Foreign Office, Dienststelle Ribbentrop, made
an appointment by telephone with Mr. Lachman to arrive at an
appointed time. The memorandum continues:
"In answer to my question, with whom I was dealing and
which official bureau he represented, he informed me
that he was not himself the district representative of
Ribbentrops Private Foreign Office, but that a Mr.
Landrat Bollman was such and that he himself had come
at Mr. Bollmans order." (D-206)
After discussing the confusion in the field of foreign
propaganda, the memorandum states that Ribbentrops Foreign
Office is creating a private organization for foreign
propaganda, and that for this purpose the support of the
Krupp firm and especially an index of addresses are needed.
This request received the following response:
"I informed Mr. Lachman that our firm has put itself years ago at the disposal of the official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda, and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the utmost." (D-206)
These activities are demonstrated by another document found
in the files of the Krupp company. A memorandum prefaced by
Herr Sonnenberg, on 14 October 1937, reports a meeting at
Essen on 12 October 1937. The governments request for
assistance in foreign intelligence activities met this
response:
"On our part we undertook to supply information to the
Combined Services Ministry (R) as required." (D-167)
Meanwhile the conspirators program of self-sufficiency was
proceeding with great speed. The production of steel, for
example, as shown in official German publication, rose as
follows:
1933 - 74,000 tons
The production of gasoline increased at an even greater
tempo: from 387,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938
(Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich, 1939-1942).
The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament
program with a sense of urgency betraying their awareness of
the imminence of war. At a meeting on 4 September 1936
Goering pointed out that "all measures have been taken just
as
[[Page 362]
if we were actually in the state of imminent danger of war."
He pointed out that:
"***if war should break out tomorrow we would be
forced to take measures from which we might possibly
still shy away at the present moment. They are
therefore to be taken." (EC-416)
The extreme urgency was manifested by Goering's remark that
"***existent reserves will have to be touched for
the purpose of carrying us over this difficulty until
the goal ordered by the Fuehrer has been reached; in
case of war they are not a reliable backing in any
case." (EC-416)
Schacht was advised by a top secret letter dated 31 August
1936 that Hitler ordered all formations of the air force to
be ready by 1 April 1937. (1301-PS)
After their successes in Austria and the Sudetenland, the
Nazi conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip
themselves for the war of aggression which they planned to
launch. In a conference on 14 October 1938, shortly before
the Nazis made their first demands on Poland, Goering
stated:
"***Everybody knows from the press what the world
situation looks like, and therefore the Fuehrer has
issued an order to him to carry out a gigantic program
compared to which previous achievements are
insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which
he will overcome with the utmost energy and
ruthlessness." (1301-PS)
The supply of foreign currency had sunken because of
preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Replenishment was considered necessary. At the same
conference, on 14 October 1938, Goering declared:
"These gains made through the export are to be used for
an increased armament. The armament should not be
curtailed by export activities." (1301-PS)
Goering had received the order from the Fuehrer to increase
armaments to an abnormal extent, the air force having first
priority, and interpreted it as follows:
"Within the shortest time, the air force should be
increased five fold; also the navy should create war
weapons more rapidly, and the army should produce large
amounts of war weapons at a faster rate, particularly
heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Along with this a
larger production of armaments must go, especially
fuel, rubber, powders and explosives must be moved to
the foreground. This should be coupled with an
accelerated expansion of highways, canals, and
particularly of the railroads." (1301-PS)
[Page 363]
In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of
wills ensued between Goering and Schacht, as a result of
which Schacht resigned his position as head of the Ministry
of Economics and Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in
November 1937. He was removed from the presidency of the
Reichsbank in January 1939. Regardless of the details of
this controversy, Schacht's departure in no way implied any
disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis. Schacht
took particular pride in his vast attainments in the
financial and-economic fields in aid of the Nazi war
machine. In a letter to General Thomas Schacht wrote:
"I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the
Ministry of Economics which afforded me the opportunity
to assist in the rearmament of the German people in the
most critical period, not only in the financial but
also in the economic sphere. I have always considered a
rearmament of the German people as condition sine quo
non of the establishment of a new German nation." (EC-257)
In a letter written to General Von Blomberg, on 8 July 1937,
Schacht wrote:
"The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary
would in that event never take place entirely independent
from the rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at
accomplishment of the political war purpose with the
assistance of all economic forces. I am entirely willing,
therefore, to participate in this way in the preparation of
the forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act." (EC-252)
In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with
representatives of the three branches of the armed forces in
"war games in war economy" at Godesberg. A report of these
exercises, entitled War economy tasks in Godesberg
undertaken by General Staff between the 25th of May and the
2nd of June," records the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht:
"Before I start with the discussion of the war game in
war economy, I have to express how grateful we all are
that you, President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the
trouble personally to participate in our final
discussion today despite all your other activities.
This proves to us your deep interest in war economy
tasks shown at all times and your presence is renewed
proof that you are willing to facilitate for us
soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to
strengthen the harmonious cooperation with your
offices."
*******
"I want to point out, however, that all matters and all
[Page 364]
information received has to be kept in strictest
secrecy ***" (EC-17)
The annexation of Austria was apparently a goal which
Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of
the former Austrian National Bank he declared:
"***Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to
be the bearer of German culture, to insure respect and
regard for the German name, especially in the direction
of the southeast. Such a mission can only be performed
within the Great German Reich and based on the power of
a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless of the wish
of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of
Europe."
*******
"We have read a lot in the foreign press during the
last few days that this aim, the union of both
countries, is to a certain degree justified, but that
the methods of effecting this union was terrible. This
method which certainly did not suit one or the other
power was nothing but the consequence of countless
perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign
countries have practiced against us ***"
"***I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which
give offense and there I would not like to depart from
this consideration. I know that there are even in this
country a few people -- I believe they are not too
numerous -- who find fault with the events of the last few
days, but nobody, I believe) doubts the goal, and it
should be said to all grumblers that you can't satisfy
everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe
one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not
do it, and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler;
and if there is still something left to be improved,
then those grumblers should try to bring about these
improvements from the German Reich, and within the
German community, but not to disturb us from without."
(EC-297-A)
A memorandum of 7 January 1939, written by Schacht and other
directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urged a balancing of
the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation.
The memorandum continued:
"***From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of
the fact that a successful foreign policy can be
attained only by the reconstruction of the German armed
forces. It [the Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very
great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament
[Page 365]
in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The
justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed
all other considerations into the background, to carry
through the armament at once, out of nothing, and
furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible." (EC-369)
The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that
a point had been reached where greater production of
armaments was no longer possible. That was merely a judgment
on the situation and not a moral stand, for there was no
opposition to Hitler's policy of aggression. Doubts were
merely entertained as to whether that policy could be
financed. Hitler's letter to Schacht on the occasion of
Schacht's departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to
Schacht's great efforts in furthering the program of the
Nazi conspirators. The armed forces by now had enabled
Hitler to take Austria and the Sudetenland. Hitler, in his
letter to Schacht declared:
"Your name, above all, will always be connected with
the first epoch of national rearmament." (EC-397)
Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank,
Schacht was retained as a minister without portfolio and
special confidential adviser to Hitler. Funk stepped into
Schacht's position as president of the Reichsbank
(Voelkisher Beobachter of 21 January 1939). Funk was
uninhibited by fears of inaction, and like Goering, under
whom he had served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no
obstacles to the plan to attack Poland. In a letter written
on 25 August 1939, only a few days before the attack on
Poland, Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was
prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international
currency and credit system occasioned by a large-scale war.
He said that he had secretly transferred all available funds
of the Reichsbank abroad into gold, and that Germany stood
ready to meet the financial and economic tasks which lay
ahead. (699-PS)
It seems clear that the Nazi conspirators directed the whole
of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive war.
To paraphrase the words of Goering, the conspirators gave
the German people "guns instead of butter." They also gave
history its most striking example of a nation gearing itself
in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war.
Their economic preparations formulated and applied with the
energy of Goering the financial wizardry of Schacht, and the
willing complicity of Funk, among others, were the
indispensable prerequisites for their subsequent campaign of
aggression.
The
original plaintext version
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Volume
I Chapter VIII
The Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy
(Part 4 of 5)
1934 - 105,000 tons
1935 - 145,000 tons
1936 - 186,000 tons
1937 - 217,000 tons
1938 - 477,000 tons