The Planning Of Aggression
[Page 15]
CONFERENCES OF THE 23RD NOVEMBER, 1939
At the meeting of the 23rd November, 1939, Hitler was
looking back to things accomplished; at the earlier meetings
now to be considered, he was looking forward, and revealing
his plans to his confederates. The comparison is instructive.
The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on the
5th November, 1937, was attended by Lieutenant Colonel
Hoszbach, Hitler's personal adjutant, who compiled a long
note of the proceedings, which he dated the 10th November,
1937, and signed.
The persons present were Hitler, and the Defendants Goering,
von Neurath, and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-
Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively, General von
Blomberg, Minister of War, and General von Fritsch, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference
was of such high importance that in other States it would
have taken place before the Cabinet. He went on to say that
the subject matter of his speech was the result of his
detailed deliberations, and of his experiences during his
four and a half years
[Page 16]
of Government. He requested that the statements he was about
to make should be looked upon in the case of his death as
his last will and testament. Hitler's main theme was the
problem of living space, and he discussed various possible
solutions, only to set them aside. He then said that the
seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was
therefore necessary, expressing himself in these words:
He concluded with this observation:
Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive
intentions of Hitler, and the events which soon followed
showed the reality of his purpose. It is impossible to
accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean war;
for after pointing out that Germany might expect the
opposition of England and France, and analyzing the strength
and the weakness of those powers in particular situations,
he continued:
The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical
international situation, in which he would take action not
later than 1943 to 1945, saying:
The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the
plain intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in
this connection Hitler said:
He further added:
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was
discussed in some detail; the action was to be taken as soon
as a favorable opportunity presented itself.
[Page 17]
The military strength which Germany had been building up
since 1933, was now to be directed at the two specific
countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The Defendant Goering testified that he did not believe at
that time that Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and
Czechoslovakia, and that the purpose of the conference was
only to put pressure on von Fritsch to speed up the re-
armament of the Army.
The Defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor von
Fritsch, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually
meant war, a conviction which the Defendant Raeder claims
that he held up to 22nd August, 1939. The basis of this
conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a
"political solution" of Germany's problems. But all that
this means, when examined, is the belief that Germany's
position would be so good, and Germany's armed might so
overwhelming that the territory desired could be obtained
without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that
Hitler's declared intention with regard to Austria was
actually carried out within a little over four months from
the date of the meeting, and within less than a year the
first portion of Czechoslovakia was absorbed, and Bohemia
and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had existed in
the minds of any of his hearers in November, 1937, after
March of 1939 there could no longer be any question that
Hitler was in deadly earnest in his decision to resort to
war. The Tribunal is satisfied that Lieutenant Colonel
Hoszbach's account of the meeting is substantially correct,
and that those present knew that Austria and Czechoslovakia
would be annexed by Germany at the first possible
opportunity.
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(Part 2 of
2)
[LORD JUSTICE LAWRENCE, Member for the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, continues]
AND 5TH NOVEMBER, 1937 (CONTINUED)
"It is not a case of conquering people but of
conquering agriculturally useful space. It would
also be more to the purpose to seek raw material
producing territory in Europe directly adjoining
the Reich and not overseas, and this solution
would have to be brought into effect for one or
two generations .. The history of all times --
Roman Empire, British Empire -- has proved that
every space expansion can only be effected by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even
setbacks are unavoidable: neither formerly nor
today has space been found without an owner; the
attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
"The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest could be made at the lowest
cost."
"The German question can be solved only by way of
force, and this is never without risk .. If we
place the decision to apply force with risk at the
head of the following expositions, then we are
left to reply to the questions 'when' and 'how'.
In this regard we have to decide upon three
different cases."
"If the Fuehrer is still living then it will be
his irrevocable decision to solve the German space
problem not later than 1943 to 1945. The necessity
for action before 1943 to 1945 will come under
consideration in Cases 2 and 3."
"For the improvement of our military-political
position, it must be our first aim in every case
of entanglement by war to conquer Czechoslovakia
and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any
threat from the flanks in case of a possible
advance westwards."
"The annexation of the two States to Germany
militarily and politically would constitute a
considerable relief, owing to shorter and better
frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for
other purposes, and the possibility of
reconstituting new armies up to a strength of
about twelve divisions."
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