Fifth Day:
Monday, 26rd November, 1945
[Page 164]
(2) The loss of time caused by transporting the
bulk of the divisions by rail - which is
unavoidable, but should be cut down as far as
possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow
at the time of the action.
(3) 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out
immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy
fortification lines at numerous points and in a
strategically favourable direction. The thrusts are
to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge
of roads, targets, composition of the columns
according to their individual tasks.) Simultaneous
attacks by the Army and Air Force.
The Air Force is to support the individual columns
(for example dive-bombers sealing of installations
at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of
reserves, destroying signal communications traffic,
thereby isolating the garrisons).
(4) Politically, the first four days of military
action are the decisive ones. If there are no
effective military successes, a European crisis
will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove
the senselessness of foreign military intervention,
draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils)
and demoralise 'Gruen.'
Therefore: bridging the time gap between first
penetration and employment
[Page 165]
(5) if possible, separation of transport movement 'Rot'
from 'Gruen.'"
C. Propaganda.
(2) Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the
Czechs (Gruenen)."
As the Indictment was being read, at the opening of the
case, when this particular allegation was reached, the
defendant Goering shook his head slowly and solemnly in the
negative. I can well understand that he would have shaken
his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictment to
be untrue. In the course of Mr. Justice Jackson's opening
address, when this same matter was referred to, the
defendant Goering again solemnly shook his head. On this
allegation the prosecution stands on the evidence just
submitted, the denials of the defendant Goering
notwithstanding.
If the Court please, would this be a convenient time to
recess ?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2
o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 14.00 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested
earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the
formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland, and
with it the resulting initiation of aggressive war in Poland
in September 1939. This is covered by paragraphs 4 a) and
(b) of Section IV (in) of the Indictment appearing on page 9
of the printed English text.
Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the
Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own
handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be
a troublesome colloquialism to translate. I don't know. The
document consists of minutes of a conference held on the
23rd May, 1939. The place of the conference was the
Fuehrer's study in the New Reich Chancellery. The defendant
Goering was present
(The defendant Frick at this point made a statement in
German, which was not translated.)
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had
referred to the wrong year. My notes show the 23rd May,
1939. That is shown by the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document you are referring to?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is document L-79. As I said, the
defendant Goering was present. The defendant Raeder was
present. The defendant Keitel was present. The subject of
the meeting was, and I quote: "Indoctrination on the
political situation and future aims." This document is of
historical importance, second not even to the political will
and testament of the Fuehrer, recorded by Adjutant Hoszbach.
[Page 166]
This document also is of such great importance historically
and as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal
that I feel obliged to read most of it. At the top: Geheime
Reichssache "Top Secret."
Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and
future aims.
The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference
The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised
form below.
Our present situation must be considered from two points
of view
In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all
fields. Our military situation improved enormously.
Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has
remained the same.
Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The
balance of power had been effected without the
participation of Germany.
This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for
the necessities of life make themselves felt, and
Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands ire
regarded as 'Encroachments'. The English are more afraid
of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple
threat of force.
A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological
problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved.
No German can evade the creation of the necessary
economic conditions for this. The solution of the
problems demands coverage. The principle, by which one
evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to
circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must
rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without
invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign
property.
Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the
State, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a
time to face the problem, but finally it is solved
[Page 167]
We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which
is by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to
good use. All measures have been taken in the correct
sequence and in harmony with our aims.
After six years, the situation is today as follows:
The national-political unity of the Germans has been
achieved apart from minor exceptions."
The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is no 'supplementary enemy.' Poland will always
be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties
of friendship, Poland has always had the secret
intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a
question of expanding our living space in the East and
of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the
Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from
thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural
fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will
enormously increase the surplus.
There is no other possibility for Europe.
Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This
does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.
If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the
possession of extensive areas in the East will be
advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record
harvests even less in time of war than in peace.
The population of non-German areas will perform no
military service, but will be available as a source of
labour. The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict
with the West.
Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier
against Russia.
It is questionable whether military success in the West
can be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is
the attitude of Poland.
The Polish government will not resist pressure from
Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the
West, and will attempt to rob us of that victory.
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we
are left with the decision:
To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. "
Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give
the final order to attack.
There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western
Powers (France and England).
If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will
not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be
primarily against England and France.
Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland -
beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be
successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this
is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the
West and to settle Poland at the same time.
The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.
Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for
various reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be
somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in
Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking
Russia in good time.
Economic relations with Russia are possible only if
political relations have improved. A cautious trend is
apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible
[Page 168]
If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia
against Germany, Italy and Japan, 1 would be constrained
to attack England and France with a few annihilating
blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful
settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for
the conflict. England sees in our development the
foundation of a hegemony which would weaken her. England
is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with her will
be a life-and-death struggle.
What, will this struggle be like? (Underscored in the
German original.)
England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate her with
a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that
the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as
possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall).
The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the
duration of our resistance.
The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by
armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be
ignored. If England and France intend the war between
Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will
support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make
them build fortifications in order finally to force them
into co-operation.
Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to
pressure.
Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish
war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We
must aim at securing a new defence line on Dutch soil up
to the Zuider Zee.
The war with England and France will be a life-and-death
struggle.
The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there
is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it
is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of
life or death for 80 million human beings.
Question: Short or long war?
Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a
short war. The government, however, must also be
prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.
History has always shown that people have believed that
wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still
prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war.
Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But
on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as
possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave
weakening (for example Ruhr basin). England has similar
weaknesses.
England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of
her world power.
"England is the driving force against Germany " (which
translated literally means: "England is the motor
driving against Germany.") [
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(Part 4 of 7)
[MR ALDERMAN continues]
B. Military Conclusions.
'Rot' was the code name for their then plan against the
West.
(1) The preparations are to be made for the
political possibilities (2 and 3) Case 2 is the
undesired one since 'Gruen' will have taken
security measures.
"A simultaneous strategic concentration 'Rot' can lead
'Rot' to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must
be possible to put 'Case Rot' into operation, at any
time.
In the reading of this document, the Tribunal doubtless
noted particularly paragraph 3, under the heading "Political
Aspect", which reads as follows: "Lightning-swift action as
the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German
ambassador as an upshot of an anti-German demonstration)."
The document as a whole, establishes that the conspirators
were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the
world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It
established, I submit, that consideration was being given to
assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the
requisite incident. This is alleged in paragraph 3(c) of
section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at page 8 of the
printed English text of the Indictment.
(1) Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in
Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).
(Initialled by Schmundt.)"
"To be transmitted by officer only.
I suppose they were those in the concentration camps. -
of a Conference on 23rd May, 1939.
Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.
Adjutant on duty: Lt.-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt. (1) Analysis of the situation.
(2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces
arising from that situation.
(3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
(4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work
resulting from those consequences. Secrecy is the
first essential for success. (1) The actual development of events between 1933 and
1939;
(2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which
Germany lies. "Further successes cannot be obtained without the
shedding of blood.
That, if the Court please, is underscored in the original
German text.
"We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The
success of the isolation will be decisive.