Fifth Day:
Monday, 26rd November, 1945
[Page 168]
(1) The British themselves are proud, courageous,
tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers.
They know how to exploit every new development. They
have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic
race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German
average is higher.
(2) World power in itself. It has been constant for 300
years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power
is not merely something concrete, but must also be
considered as a psychological force embracing the entire
world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with
consequential financial credit.
(3) Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea
power and a courageous air force.
England's weakness.
If in the World War 1 we had had two battleships and two
cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been
begun in the morning, the British Fleet would have been
defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have
meant the end of this war" - that war, I take it - " It
was formerly not sufficient to defeat the
[Page 169]
The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is
forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is
destroyed; immediate capitulation will be the result.
There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a
quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the
government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:
(1) Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles
concerned.
(2) Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the
whole enterprise.
(3) Human failings.
(4) Weather conditions.
The final date for striking must be fixed well in
advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured
for long. It must be home in mind that weather
conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy
and Air Force impossible.
This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of
action.
(1) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a
significant or the final decisive blow. Consideration of
right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the
matter. This will only be possible if we are not
involved in a war with England on account of Poland.
(2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for
a long war must be made while opportunities on the on
the Continent for England are eliminated.
The army will have to hold positions essential to the
Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are
successfully occupied and held, and if France is also
defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful
war against England will have been secured.
England can then be blockaded from Western France at
close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its
submarines can extend the range of the blockade.
Consequences:
England will not be able to fight on the Continent.
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her
life-lines.
Time will not be on England's side.
Germany will not bleed to death on land.
Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World
War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is
responsible for the following strategic considerations
which are imperative:-
(1)With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War,
or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel
ports, the end would have been different.
(2) A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air
force. It is impossible to attack all objectives
simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes
would evoke defence countermeasures.
(3) The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
(4) Once the Army, in co-operation with the Air Force
and Navy, has taken the most important positions,
industrial production will cease to flow into the
bottomless pit of the Army's battles, and can be
diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these
positions. Systematic preparations must be made for the
attack.
Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning
battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
[Page 170]
Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered
to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements
of surprise and by masterly handling."
The document just read is the evidence which specifically
supports the allegations in Paragraph 4(a) of Section IV (F)
of the indictment, appearing on page 9 of the printed
English text, relating to the meeting of 23rd May, 1939. We
think it leaves nothing unproved in those allegations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the
last page and the last five lines, because they refer in
terms to one of the defendants.
MR. ALDERMAN: I didn't read these, Mr. President, simply
because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the
English translation. I will be glad to have them read in the
original German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.
MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is
wrong?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.
MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have a reference to the last Paragraph
headed "Working principles"?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter
read that, as it can be translated into the other languages.
It is on page 16 of the original.
BY THE INTERPRETER: Page 16.
(1) Study of the entire problem.
(2) Study of the events.
(3) Study of the means needed.
(4) Study of the necessary training.
Men with great powers of imagination and high technical
training must belong to the staff, as well as officers
with sober and sceptical powers of understanding.
Working principles:-
(1) No one is to take part in this who does not have to
know of it.
(2) No one can find out more than he must know.
(3) When must the person in question know it at the very
latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary
that he know it.
On Goering's question, the Fuehrer decided that:-
(a) The armed forces determine what shall be built.
(b) In the shipbuilding programme, nothing is to be
changed.
(c) The armament programmes are to be modelled on the
years 1943 or 1944."
MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than
I had anticipated.
THE PRESIDENT Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this
document leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the
indictment. It demonstrates that the Nazi conspirators were
proceeding in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the
cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It
demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the
Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were
not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated
to conceal their motive of aggressive expansion for food and
"Lebensraum."
In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the
initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the
attention of the Tribunal a group of
[Page 171]
We have three of these documents, related and constituting a
single group. The first one, I do not intend to offer as
evidence. The other two, I shall offer.
The reason for that decision is this: The first of the three
documents came into our possession through the medium of an
American newspaperman, and purported to be original minutes
of this meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this
American newspaperman by some other person; and we had no
proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the
person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely
served to keep our prosecution on the alert, to see if it
could find something better. Fortunately, we did get the
other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day
made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the
afternoon, as indicated by the original minutes, which we
captured. By comparison of those two documents with the
first document, we conclude that the first document was a
slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.
On 22nd August, 1939, Hitler had called together at
Obersalzberg the three Supreme Commanders of the three
branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the commanding
generals, bearing the title "Oberbefehlshaber," Commanders-
in-Chief.
I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document,
the prosecution set out to find better evidence of what
happened on this day. In this the prosecution succeeded. In
the files of the O.K.W. at Flensburg, the "Oberkommamdo der
Wehrmacht," Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,
there were uncovered two speeches delivered, by Hitler at
Obersalzberg, on 22nd August, 1939. These documents are 798
PS and 1014 PS, in our series of documents.
In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal
please, we have had the first document, which I do not
intend to offer, marked for identification exhibit USA 28.
Accordingly, I offer the second document, 798 PS, in
evidence as exhibit USA 29, and the third document 1014 PS
as exhibit USA 30.
These are, again, especially the first one, rather lengthy
speeches, and I shall not necessarily read the entire
speech.
Reading from 798 PS, which is exhibit USA 29, the Fuehrer
speaks to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22nd August, 1939. "I
have called you together."
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech
took place?
MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that
MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication "Obersalzberg" came
from the first document which I have not offered in
evidence. I have no doubt that the defendants will admit
that Obersalzberg was the place of this speech.
The place is not very significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: (Reading)
It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
come sooner or later. I had already made this decision
in Spring." (I interpolate, I think he is there
referring to the May document, which I have already
read, L-79.) "But I thought I would first turn against
the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the
East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close
one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted
to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in
order to fight first against the West, but this plan,
[Page 172]
which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since
the essential points have changed.
It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in
case of a conflict with the West.
Poland wants access to the sea.
The further development became obvious after the
occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to
me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland
could arise at an inopportune moment.
I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of
all, two personal constitutions" -
The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is
also vital. If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty
to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic
attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above
all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a
burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in
Italy.
The third factor, favourable for us, is Franco. We can
ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this
depends on Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain
uniformity and steadiness of the present system in
Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain has
not as yet a Fascist Party or our internal unity.
On the other side, a negative picture, as far as
decisive personalities are concerned. There is no
outstanding personality in England or France."
(Mr. Alderman continues)
The English Empire did not emerge from the last war
strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was
achieved: there was conflict between England and
Ireland, the South African Union became more
independent, concessions had to be made to India England
is in great danger, her industries unhealthy. A British
statesman can look into the future only with concern.
France's position has also deteriorated, particularly in
the Mediterranean.
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(Part 5 of 7)
[MR ALDERMAN continues]
"Her strength lies in the following:-
The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more
in detail with military plans and preparations. I think it
unnecessary to read further.
"Purpose:
Schmundt certified this text.
"I have called you together to give
you a picture of the political situation, in order that you
may have insight into the individual element on which I base
my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your
confidence. After this, we will discuss military details.
I suppose he means "personalities." That probably is an
inept translation -
"my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially,
it depends on me, my existence, because of my political
activities."
I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of
the fact of a war, which engulfed almost the whole world,
depending upon one man's personality.
"Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever
again have the confidence of the whole German people as
I do. There will probably never again be a man in the
future with more authority. My existence is, therefore,
a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any
time by a criminal or an idiot.
I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must have overlooked one
in England, perhaps many.
"For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to
lose - we can only gain. Our economic situation is such,
because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out
more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have
no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much
and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is
unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below
average. No personalities, no masters, no men of
action."
I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains
what he meant by no personalities - no masters having
authority that he had over his nation.
"Besides the personal favour, the political situation is
favourable for us; the Mediterranean rivalry between
Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which
leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.