Seventh Day:
Wednesday, 28th November, 1945
[page 228]
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn, then.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just
referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich
Commissar Burckel in July 1939, which outlines
[Page 229]
In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of
the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German
Government, in the following terms. I quote from page 4 of
the English text of that report, and I believe from page 4
of the German text: "In August some further arrests took
place.."
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you on?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Rainer Report, which is 812-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: 812?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, exhibit USA 61.
Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-
Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Wachter which
originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July
uprising. On the other side, Seyss-Inquart had a good
position in the legal field and especially well-
established relations with Christian-Social politicians.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the 'Styrian
Heimatschutz' (home defence) and became a party member
when the entire 'Styrian Heimatschutz' was incorporated
into the N.S.D.A.P. Another personality who had a good
position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau
who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11th
July, 1936. was strongly influenced by the activities of
these two persons."
Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January
1937, when he was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer,
describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through
the ranks, of this "Styrian Heimatschutz," points him out as
one who strongly influenced the agreement of 11th July,
1936. The strategic importance of that agreement will be
considered a little later. Rainer's report, as I have said
before, was hardly likely to over-emphasise the significance
of Seyss-Inquart's contribution'
[Page 230]
Sir,
If I may add something about myself, it is the
following: I know that I am not of an active fighting
nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this
time of pronounced activity (Aktivismus in the German)
this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my
personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable
tenacity to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater
Germany (Gross Deutschland) and the Fuehrer. And if some
people are already tired out from the struggle and some
have been killed in the fight, I am still around
somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all,
was also the development until the year 1938. Until July
1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the
party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my
membership dues (the first one, according to a receipt,
I paid in December 1931), I probably would have been an
undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member
of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the
union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight
this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give
the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desired.
I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have
stuck to this attitude with an iron determination
because I and my friends had to fight against the whole
political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led
to our political annihilation; it would have deprived
the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his
ingenious political solution for Austria, as became
evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
conscious of the fact that I am following a path which
is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my
party comrades. I followed it calmly, and would without
hesitation follow it again, because I am satisfied that
at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his
work, even though my former attitude even now gives
occasion to very worthy and honourable party comrades to
doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to
such things because I am satisfied with the opinion
which the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me."
It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a
document from the defendant von Papen, and to see how he
thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to
effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer document 2248-PS as
exhibit
[Page 231]
Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The
German Government did not do more than keep up a pretence of
non-interference with Austrian groups. It employed the
psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had
no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria could find
hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find
her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain
relief from the economic and internal pressure.
I offer document 2247-PS in evidence as exhibit USA 64. It
is a letter from von Papen while in Berlin to Hitler, dated
17th May, 1935.
Von Papen's letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright,
credible statement by Germany, reassuring Austria, would be
most useful for German diplomatic purposes and for the
improvement of relationships between Austria and German
groups in Austria.
He had a scheme for pitting von Schuschnigg and his Social-
Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of
Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to
persuade von Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the
N.S.D.A.P. in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg.
Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain
Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in
Austria.
I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of
the second page.
This is von Papen writing to "Mein Fuehrer", Hitler:
[Page 232] Signed, Papen."
Exactly four days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler
responded to von Papen's suggestion, and asserted Germany
neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an
"Anschluss."
The British will present a document covering that speech. I
merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a
sentence quite well known to history.
It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this
point, and to note that for a complexity of reasons, Papen
suggested, and Hitler announced, a policy completely at
variance with their intentions, which had been, and
continued to be, to interfere in Austria's internal affairs
and to conclude an "Anschluss."
There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure
policy.
On 1st May, 1936, Hitler, in a public speech, blandly
branded as a lie any statement that "to-morrow or the day
after " Germany would fall upon Austria.
[Page 233]
Without offering the document, I ask the Court to take
Judicial notice of the statement in that well-known speech.
If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most
literal and misleading sense, that is, that he would not
actually fall upon Austria "to-morrow or the day after to-
morrow." For the conspirators well knew that the successful
execution of their purpose required for a little while
longer the quiet policy which they had been pursuing in
Austria.
I now offer in evidence our document L-150 - memorandum of
conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the defendant
von Neurath, on 18th May, 1936 - as exhibit USA 65. This
document unfortunately again appears in your document books
in German, as, due to an error, it has not been mimeographed
in English. German Counsel have the German copies.
I shall read from it, and at the same time, hand to the
interpreter reading in German, a marked copy of a German
translation.
I might read one sentence from the first paragraph.
As soon as our fortifications are constructed," he
said, "and the countries of Central Europe realise that
France cannot enter German territory, all these
countries will begin to feel very differently about
their foreign policies and a new constellation will
develop."
The first was that Mussolini had, to-day, the greater
part of his army mobilised on the Austrian border,
ready to strike, and that he would certainly strike if
he should have a good excuse.
The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain
quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was
daily growing stronger in Austria. The youth of Austria
was turning more and more towards the Nazis, and the
dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable
and only a question of time.
The third reason was that until the German
fortifications had been constructed on the French
border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy
might lead to a French attack on Germany."
I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, on page 11 of
the English text that is document 1760-PS.
[Page 234]
I merely ask a point that the Tribunal take judicial notice
of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal
part of the agreement on 11th July, 1938, will also be
proved by our British colleagues. For convenient reference,
it will be found in the document which the British will
offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on
pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, document
1760-PS.
Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked
like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing
provision to the effect that Austria in her policy,
especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a
German State, but the other two provisions clearly state
that Germany recognises the full sovereignty of Austria and
that it regards the inner political order of Austria,
including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as
an internal concern of Austria upon which Germany will
exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there
was much more substance to to-day's events than appears in
the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith's summary
as set forth on page 12 of his affidavit, document 1760-PS,
as follows :-
(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany, to
positions in the Cabinet; [
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(Part 5 of 6)
"In August some further arrests took place, the victims
of which were, apart from the Gauleiters (Gau leaders),
also Globotschnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed,
because of an instruction received from the imprisoned
Leopold, to have been made Deputy Country Leader. A
group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time
also established connection with departments of the Alt-
Reich. Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency,
etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto
in the form of a programme for the fighting movement of
Austria."
And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a
little later in 1936. I quote from page 6 of the English
text, and I think page 5 of the German text:
"The principles of the construction of the organisation
were: The organisation is the bearer of the illegal
fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret
organisation, in a simple manner and without compromise,
according to the principle of organising an elite to be
available to the illegal land-party council upon any
emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities
should be taken, and all legal people and legal chances
should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organisation. Therefore, co-operation. between
the illegal party organisation and the legal political
aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership.
All connections with the party in Germany were kept
secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer.
These said that the German State should officially be
omitted from the creation of an Austrian N.S.D.A.P.; and
that auxiliary centres for propaganda, Press, refugees,
welfare, etc., should be established in the foreign
countries bordering Austria.
The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the
Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and
awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret
contacts with Reich officials, and using foreign
personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.
The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more
discreet in their activities and could be referred to as
nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained
consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by
other Nazis like Captain Leopold.
"To the General Field Marshal,
Now, that letter was written to one of the men close to him
- to Field Marshal Goering. I think that is enough to
demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler, a
foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi conspiracy,
led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his
disposal.
At present in Vienna,
14th July, 1939.
"National Socialism must and will overpower the new
Austrian ideology. If to-day it is contended in Austria
that the N.S.D.A.P. is only a centralised Reich German
party, and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of
thought of National Socialism to groups of a different
political make-up, the answer must rightly be that the
national revolution in Germany could not have been
brought about in a different way. But when the creation
of the people's community in the Reich is completed,
National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than
this is possible through the present party organisation
- at least apparently - certainly become the rallying
point for all racially German units beyond the borders.
Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be
achieved to-day with any centralised tendency. If this
recognition would once and for all be stated clearly
from within the Reich, then it would easily become
possible to effect a break-through into the front of the
New Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as 'The
German Day' as in old times, and the proclamation of a
National Socialist peoples' front, would be a stirring
event for all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such
attacks would win us also the particularistic Austrian
circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic Count Dubskv,
wrote in his pamphlet about the 'Anschluss': The Third
Reich will be with Austria or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it
is unable to solve this task."
We have other reports from Papen to Hitler, which I shall
offer in evidence presently, showing that he maintained
covert contact with the National Socialist groups in
Austria. It is certainly interesting that from the very
start of his mission, defendant von Papen was thinking of
ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism
for national Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen
was working for the Anschluss, although he preferred to use
the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on the
party organisation as a necessary means of establishing
those principles in the German Reich.
"I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The
fundamental idea should be to pit von Schuschnigg and
his Christian Social forces, who are opposed to a home-
front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility
of thwarting
In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and a
credible assurance of the preservation of Austria's
independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose,
with what she could always call a mere effort at peace, and
she might be able to persuade von Schuschnigg to establish
an Austrian coalition government, with the N.S.D.A.P. If she
did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in
Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste.
"I called on von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
on 18th May, and had a long talk on the general
European situation."
Then skipping a paragraph I will read straight on, if you
will pardon me.
"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs
until the Rhineland had been digested. He explained
that he meant that, until the German fortifications had
been constructed on the French and Belgium frontiers,
the German Government would do everything possible to
prevent, rather than encourage, an outbreak by the
Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with
regard to Czechoslovakia.
I then skip two paragraphs.
"Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been
reached between Germany and Italy, and admitted that
the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and
Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in
reality. He went on to say that at the present time he
could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests
of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there
were three chief reasons why the German Government was
urging the Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the
present time:
But even if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in
Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly improved over
1934, a fact which influenced Austria's willingness to make
concessions to Germany and to come to terms.
"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring Of 1936
gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in
the direction of the Nazification of
This weakening of
Austria helped to leave the way for the Pact of 11th July,
1936. On 11th July, 1936, the Governments of Austria and
Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in
evidence also by the British Delegation.
"Even more important than the terms of the agreement
published in the official communique, was the
contemporaneous informal understanding, the most
important provisions of which were that Austria would :
(2) with the devised give the National opposition a role
in the political life of Austri4, within the framework
of the Patriotic Front; and
(3) grant an amnesty for all Nazis, save those convicted
of the most serious offences."