Fifteenth Day:
Friday, 7th December, 1945
[Page 221]
It is important that action be taken as soon as
possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering
States participate in a suitable way. Actual military
support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy,
Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too.
Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia.
The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassadors have already
been notified. During the day a message will be
addressed to the Duce.
Politically it is especially important that the blow
against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful
harshness and that the military destruction is done in a
lightning-like undertaking. In this way Turkey would
become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against
Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable way.
It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side
when we attack. A corresponding political treatment
(autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war
against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy,
Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to
be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for
Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for
Bulgaria.
This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all
preparations and use such strong forces that the
Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest
time." [Page 222]
Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of
the document, which I would like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th April?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: The 6th April.
Then again, still in the same document, the last part of it,
Part V, at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by
the defendant Jodl, and I would read one small paragraph at
the top of the following page, Page 6:
Now, passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I
put that in as Exhibit GB 125. It is an extract from the
order issued after the meeting, from the minutes of which I
have just read, that is, the meeting of 27th March, recorded
in PS-1746, Part II. It is worth reading the first
paragraph:
(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a
dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece.
Considered from the purely military point of view,
German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at
all justified as long as the attitude, of Yugoslavia
remained ambiguous, and she could threaten the left
flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.
(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly
have endeavoured to bring Yugoslavia into our community
bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these
attempts did not meet with success, or they were begun
too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports
leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign
policy of Yugoslavia.
[Page 223]
(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
measures in order to meet a critical development with
necessary military means. The change in the deployment
of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I
would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any
further operations in Albania in the course of the next
few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover
and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia
into Albania with all available forces.
These measures should not be considered as designed for
a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures
designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three
weeks a crisis arising.
I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should
reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with
all available means and with utmost speed.
(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything
which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy
and that only personalities who necessarily must be
notified know anything about them. These measures will
completely lose their value should they become known."
I pass to R-95, the next document in the bundle, which I put
in as Exhibit GB 127. It was referred to by my learned
friend, the Attorney General. It is an operational order,
signed by General von Brauchitsch, which is merely passing
to the Armies the orders contained in Directive No. 25,
which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in
as Exhibit GB 125. I will not trouble the Tribunal with
reading it.
I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as
Exhibit GB 114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took
place on this morning, 6th April, on which Hitler issued the
proclamation from which this passage is an extract:-
The documents published today afford" - that refers to
the German 'White Book' which they published of all the
documents leading up to the invasion - "The documents
published today afford a glimpse of a practice which, in
accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant
attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British
interests.
In the face of this I have always emphasised that:
(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek
people but that
(2) We shall never, as in the first World War, tolerate
a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the
object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence
from the South-east into
[Page 224]
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document
which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as
Exhibit USA 34. It is a record of a lecture delivered by the
defendant Jodl on 7th November, 1943. At Page 4 there is a
short passage which sets out his views two and a-half years
later on the action taken in April, 1941. I refer to
Paragraph 11 on Page 4:-
In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, though to be liquidated in due
course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every
effort was made to secure her co-operation for the offensive
against Greece or, at least, to ensure that she would
abstain from any interference.
The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it
was then decided that, irrespective of whether or not his
government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or
even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be
liquidated.
It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain
Yugoslavia's intentions when it would be so little trouble,
now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her
militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early
[Page 225]
That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and
Yugoslavia. But, as I have the honour to conclude the
British case, I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me,
to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common
factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I
can do it, I think, in five minutes.
It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression,
which was used with singular consistency, not only by the
Nazis themselves but also by their Italian friends. Their
technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum
advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of
unopposed military advance into the country of the
unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus there was,
of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.
The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small
hours of the night of 8th-9th April, and was well under way
as a military operation before the diplomatic explanations
and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister,
at 4.20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian
Minister, between 4.30 and 5 on that morning.
The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland began not
later than 5 o'clock, in most cases earlier, in the small
hours of 10th May, whilst the formal ultimatum, delivered in
each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was
not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland, the
invasion began between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning. It
was not until 6 o'clock, when The Hague had already been
bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van
Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at
5 o'clock, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8
o'clock. The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 o'clock and
it was at 7 o'clock when the German Minister asked to see M.
Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the
morning of 28th October, 1940, when his Minister in Athens
presented a three-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both
began in the small hours of 6th April, 1941. In the case of
Yugoslavia, no diplomatic exchange took place even after the
event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler - a
proclamation from which I read an extract - at 5 o'clock
that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was
bombed.
In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 5.20 a.m. that
M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering
Greek territory.
The manner in which this long series of aggressions was
carried out is, in itself, further evidence of the
essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi
regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial
advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their
method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian,
of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word,
nor for the rights of any people but its own.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on
after a short adjournment. That is what you were intending
to do
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding
with the presentation of the evidence relating to the
aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15
minutes to offer two further documents relating to the
aggression against Austria.
These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book,
supplement to document Book N.
Both documents are correspondence of the British Foreign
Office. They have been made available to us through the
courtesy of our British colleagues.
First, I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA
127. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12th
March, 1938, from Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the
British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It reads:-
With reference to your Telegram No. 79 of 11th March, I
have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a
copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath
in accordance with the instructions contained therein
and which was delivered on the same evening.
The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to
Baron von Neurath at the same
time."
My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter
alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his
replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new
Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be
National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian
Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in
Vienna.
I am instructed by my Government to represent
immediately to the German Government that if this report
is correct H. M.G." - meaning His Majesty's Government -
"in the U.K. feels bound to register a protest in the
strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by
force against an independent state in order to create a
situation incompatible with its national independence.
As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already
been informed in London, such action is bound to produce
very great reactions, of which it is impossible to
foretell the issues." [
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(Part 8 of 9)
[COLONEL PHILLIMORE continues]
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible
loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all
preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily
and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be
made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the
Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in
the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start
as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are
ready.
Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that
third paragraph - two days after the pact had been signed
and the assurances given - because there has been a coup
d'etat, and it is just possible that the operations against
"5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early
as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air
Force ground installations and to destroy the capital
Belgrade in attacks by waves."
I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how
ruthlessly this bombing was done, when the residential areas
of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday
morning, the morning of the 6th.
"In the event of the political development requiring an
armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German
intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as
soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces and to
dissolve her national territory."
I read that because the plan is issued from the office of
the defendant Jodl.
"The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the
political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in
spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time
being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed
as speedily as possible."
I pass to the next document, PS-1835, which I put in
evidence as Exhibit GB 126. It is an original telegram,
containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, forwarded
through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the
defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of
the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat
fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might
read the first five paragraphs:
"Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the
quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the
consequences which may result from it.
Then he goes on to emphasise further the importance of
secrecy.
"From the beginning of the struggle it has been
England's steadfast endeavour to make the Balkans a
theatre of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using
the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring
Greece by a guarantee offered to her and then finally in
misusing her for Britain's purposes.
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's
particular attention:-
"In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe
it has been my endeavour since the day of my assumption
of power above all to establish a friendly relationship
with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind
everything that once took place between Germany and
Serbia, I have not only offered the Serbian people the
hand of the German people, but in addition have made
efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all
difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State
and various nations allied to Germany."
One can only think that when he issued that proclamation
Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with
Ciano in August, 1939, and the meeting with the defendant
Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a few days earlier.
"What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of
affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in
consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against
Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of
1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was
contrary to all agreement, but in the end led to a
decision on our part which-taking a long view of the
matter-would have become necessary, in any case, sooner
or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North
was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an
ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from
gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our
Roumanian oil area from that country."
If I might summarise the story: The invasion of Greece was
decided on at least as early as November or December, 1940,
and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April,
1941 No consideration was at any time given to any
obligations under treaties or conventions which might make
such invasion a breach of International Law. Care was taken
to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might
have an unsuspecting victim.
[Page 226]
One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was
evolved by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk,
the defendant Ribbentrop.
"My Lord,
The enclosure is the note of 11th March, from the British
Embassy to defendant von Neurath and it reads as follows
"Dear Reich Minister,