The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany
December 17, 1945 to January 4, 1946

Twenty-Seventh Day: Friday, 4th January, 1946
(Part 4 of 9)


[COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR continues]

[Page 308]

The structure and the functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are included in Document Book 1. I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.

In the first place two American officers who were selected for their ability and experience in interviewing high-ranking German prisoners-of-war were briefed by an Intelligence Officer and by the trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the organisational side of the German Armed Forces. These officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German. It was emphasised that the function of these interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the organisation of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the prosecution wanted to be accurately informed.

The German generals to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said, and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure the most accurate testimony that we could on organisational matters.

I will take up these affidavits one by one, and I think the members of the Tribunal will see that they fully support the prosecution's description of the group, and conclusively establish that this group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The Soviet and French judges have copies in French and Russian, and the defence has copies in German.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder who held the rank of "Generaloberst " or Colonel-General - the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be Exhibit USA 531- Halder was Chief of the General Staff of O.K.H. That would be the box

[Page 309]

second from the bottom on the left-hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the O.K.H. from September, 1938, to September, 1942. He is, accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organisation. His statement is short, and I will read it in full:
"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of the State, who prior to 2nd August, 1934, was Field Marshal von Hindenburg and thereafter, until 1945, was Adolf Hitler.

Specialised military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high- ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the O.K.W. in the name of their respective commanding officers, and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time the Head of the State).

The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields, and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be under- taken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 2znd August, 1939, prior to the Polish campaign, and the consulta- tion at the Reich Chancellery on 14th June, 1941, prior to the Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

(Signed) Halder."

The chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the front of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are covered by documents which will be introduced subsequently.

I next offer a substantially identical statement by von Brauchitsch, which will be Exhibit USA 532. Von Brauchitsch held the rank of Field Marshal and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941, and therefore was also a member of the group. I need not read his statement, since it is practically the same as that given by Halder, but I will ask that it be set forth in full in the transcript at this point. The only difference between the two statements is in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment "was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces," whereas von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, "In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces." Otherwise, the two statements are identical.

[Page 310]

(The document referred to above is as follows.)

"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who, prior to 2nd August, 1934, was Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and thereafter until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.

Specialised military matters were the responsibility of the three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State), that is to say, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in the official capacity and by virtue of their training, theirpositions and their mutual contracts. Plans for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group according to the instructions of the O.K.W. in the name of their respective Commanding Officers and were presented by them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State).

The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of preparing for military operations within their competent fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22nd August, 1939, prior to the Polish campaign, and the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14th June, 1941, prior to the Russian campaign. The composition of this group and the relationship of its members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.

(Signed) von Brauchitsch."

COLONEL TAYLOR: Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart, which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement, has been laid before von Brauchitsch and Halder, and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top Organisation of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the prosecution's statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth some of the matters of detail to which I referred in describing the group. It is quite short. It is Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA 533, and I shall read it. in full into the transcript :

"The most important department in the O.K.W. was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs, they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff.

[Page 311]

The O.K.W. Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defence Section and it was primarily con- cemed with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards, Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the O.K.W. Operations Staff.

There was, during World War II, no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high-ranking officers described in my statement of 7th November (in the Army, General Staff of the Army, and in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force).

Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff,

(Signed) Halder."

The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of O.K.W., O.K.L., O.K.H. and O.K.M., and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the O.K.W. staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities.

I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte, and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets always had the status of " Oberbefehlshaber," but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force, and was personal aide to the defendant Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes Exhibit USA 534. It reads as follows:

"Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the 'Oberbefehlshaber' of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units subordinate to them, and were directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation 'Befehlshaber' and from then on that of 'Oberbefehlshaber.' This change of designa- tion carried with it no change from the functions and responsibilities that they previously had."

Your Honour, that concludes the description of the composition of the group and its personnel. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel for the group, and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of these inquiries now, as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me two days ago.

The first is from Hofrat Dullmann, and he has asked whether the group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank; whether it includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or "Generaloberst."

[Page 312]

The answer to that is clearly "No." As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there, and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose, everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant-general in ours.

He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called General Staff Corps." The answer to that is "No." There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, "Colonel in Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them - two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.

The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of " Oberbefehlshaber," and goes on to state that he believes that "Oberbefehlshaber " includes commanders-in-chief in theatres of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the com- manders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown on the chart.

Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants, in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign, and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers of O.K.W. and O.K.H., in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans.

The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the inter- change of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers of O.K.W. and O.K.H. on the one hand and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit No- 4, which will be Exhibit USA 535. I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7th November, 1945 :

"In April, 1939, 1 was instructed by Hitler to start military prepara- tions for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, after an amendment which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to

[Page 313]

hear their wishes and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies, by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless.

In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the commander-in-chief of the army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.

The commander-in-chief of the army and his chief of staff communi- cated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies ; through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the commander-in-chief of the army, and not of the army group, who exercised jurisdiction.

(Signed) von Brauchitsch."

There follows a supplement to the statement of 7th November :
"When Hitler had made a decision to support the realisation of his political objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the commander-in-chief of the army, if he were at all involved, generally first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command. Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the O.K.H. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the O.K.W. to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the O.K.H. began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved.

Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the O.K.H. with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders. During the operations the O.K.H. maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The commander- in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them.

In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation. Orders for all operational matters went from the O.K.H. to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the O.K.H. directly to the armies.

(Signed) von Brauchitsch."

The Oberbefehlshabers in the field therefore - and in the case of the army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies - participated in planning and directing the execution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshabers were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection I invite the Court's attention to 447-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA 135 ; Document 447-PS, this being a directive of 13th March, 1941, signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command

[Page 314]

of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later on 22nd June

The documents, your Honour, are in numerical order in Document Books 2 and 3. Document Book 2 contains C and L; Document Book 3 contains PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book 3 in numerical order within the PS's. And within that document, under paragraph 1, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations and Executive Power" ("Vollziehende Gewalt"), the Tribunal will find sub-paragraph 1, in which the following appears. That is Page 1 of the translation, paragraph 2:

"It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government-General an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19th and 21st Octover, 1939, the commander-in-chief of the Army shall be authorised to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief" - that, in the original german is "Oberbefehlshaber" - "of the army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies."
Your Honour will see that this executive power, with priority over civilian agencies, was vested in the commander-in-chief of the army, with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies - to the members of the group as defined in the Indictment.

Further on in the document, under sub-paragraph 2a, the document states - that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the document:

"The ares of operations created through teh advance of the army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighbouring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The commander-in-chief of the army has the right to exercise the executive pwer (Vollziehende Gewalt) in this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the army groups and armies."
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)


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