Thirtieth Day:
Wednesday, January 9th, 1946
[Page 95]
Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New
Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity.
There never has been and probably never will be a time
when closer co-operation under the Tripartite Pact is so
important. If Japan hesitates at this time and Germany
goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all
the military might of Britain and the United States will
be concentrated against Japan.
As the Fuehrer said to-day, there are fundamental
differences between Germany and Japan, and the United
States, as to their very right to exist. We have
received advice to the effect that there is practically
no hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being
concluded successfully, because of the fact that the
United States is putting up a stiff front.
If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan
reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United
States, I am confident that that will not only be to the
interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring
about favourable results for Japan herself.'
Then the Ambassador replied:
'I can make no definite statement, as I am not aware of
any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency
indicating that a state of actual war is to be
established between Germany and the United States?'
The defendant Ribbentrop: 'Roosevelt is a fanatic, so it
is impossible to tell what he would do.'
Then: 'Concerning this point, in view of the fact that
Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States
would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops,
and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech, as well
[Page 96]
There are then a few remarks about the intended landing
operations against England, which I shall not read at this
time.
If the Tribunal would go to Part III, there again we get the
international attitude of mind of this defendant - at the
foot of Page 2, Part III, and I am quoting:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. I am
sorry. I will go back to the paragraph I have just finished.
The defendant Ribbentrop - and I am still quoting:
Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United
States, Germany, of course, would join the war
immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of
Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United
States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is
determined on that point."
Another new document, which is also an intercepted Japanese
diplomatic message, is the next one, D-657, which I put in
as Exhibit GB 149. If I might read the first two sentences,
they show what it is - and I quote:
[Page 97]
It goes without saying that this is only for your secret
information."
The next stage concerns his attempt to get Japan to attack
the Soviet Union.
In Ribbentrop's conversations with Oshima, the Japanese
Ambassador, in July, 1942, and in March and April, 1943, he
continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression
against the Soviet Union. This is shown in Document 2911-PS,
which has been put in as Exhibit USA 157 and already read,
and Document 2954-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 150.
That is a new document, and if I may I will just indicate
the effect of it by a very short quotation. This is a
discussion between the defendant Ribbentrop and Ambassador
Oshima. It begins:
The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia
was the subject of a common conference between the
Japanese Government and the Imperial Headquarters,
during which the question was discussed in detail and
investigated exactly. The result is the following: The
Japanese Government recognises absolutely the danger
which threatens from Russia and completely understands
the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part
will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is
not possible for the Japanese Government, considering
the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is
rather of the conviction that it would be in the common
interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the
other hand, the Japanese Government would never
disregard the Russian question."
The third allegation is that the defendant Ribbentrop
authorised, directed or participated in War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity.
Of course, I am considering this from the point of view of
planning these crimes only. The execution of the crimes will
be dealt with by my friends,
[Page 98]
I deal, first, with the killing of Allied aviators;
secondly, with the destruction of peoples in Europe; and
thirdly, with the persecution of the Jews.
First, the killing of Allied aviators:
With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by
the Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to
undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further
raids on the Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which
a definite policy was to be established, there is stated
what was the point of view that this defendant Ribbentrop
had been urging. That is in Document 735-PS, which I now put
in as Exhibit GB 151. That is a discussion of a meeting at
the Fuehrer's Headquarters on the 6th June, 1944. If I may,
I will read the first paragraph:
I do not think we need trouble with paragraph (a) of the
statement of the Deputy Chief of W.F.S.T. The importance of
(a) goes because Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such
cases as were mentioned.
If you look at (b):
Then, in paragraph 3, we have what was decided as justifying
the lynch law. Paragraph 3 says:
Low-level attacks with machine-guns on the civilian
population, single persons as well as crowds.
Shooting our own men in the air who had baled out.
Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in
the public service.
[Page 99]
Then on the next page, the last page of this document, We
have a somewhat curious comment from the defendant Keitel:
If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is
difficult to enforce rules.
Ministerial direktor Berndt got out and shot the enemy
aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure. It
does not work out."
Then the remarks of the defendant Jodl appear:
1. What do we consider as murder?
Signed Jodl."
In the examination of the individual cases, a
distinction must be made between the cases of lynching
and the cases of special treatment by the Security
Service (S.D.).
1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment
of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to
points 1-4 of the communication of 15th June, is not
very essential. First, the German authorities are not
directly responsible, since death will have occurred
before a German official became concerned with the case.
Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such
that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an
appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of
lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to
handle the individual cases upon publication.
[Page 100]
The Prisoner of War Agreement of 27th July, 1929,
establishes definite rules on the prosecution and
sentencing of prisoners of war, and the execution of the
death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death
sentences may be carried out only three months after the
Protective Power has been notified of the sentence; in
Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the
same courts and under the same procedure as members of
the German armed forces. These rules are so specific
that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation
of them by clever wording of the publication of an
individual incident. On the other hand, the Foreign
Office cannot recommend, on this occasion, a formal
repudiation of the Prisoner of War Agreement.
An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected
fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner of war
status; that is, that immediately upon seizure they be
told that they are not considered prisoners of war, but
criminals, that they would not be turned over to the
agencies having jurisdiction over prisoners of war;
that, therefore, they would not go to a prisoner of war
camp; but that they would be tried in a summary
procedure. If the evidence at the trial should reveal
that the special procedure is not applicable to a
particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently
be given the status of prisoner of war by transfer to
the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp, Oberursel.
Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the
possibility of Germany being accused of the violation of
existing treaties or even the adoption of reprisals upon
German prisoners of war. At any rate, this solution
would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus
relieving us of the necessity of openly having to
renounce the present agreements or of the need of having
to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the
publication of each individual case." [
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(Part 2 of 10)
[SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE continues] "Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring
whether I had received any reports regarding the
Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I
had received no official word.
Then the next part, Section 2, is an extremely optimistic
prognosis of the war against the Soviet Union. I do not
think, in view of the date in which we are reading it, that
I need trouble the Tribunal with that.
"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of
entering into any peace with England. We are determined
to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore,
at the end of this war, England will have no influence
whatsoever in international affairs. The Island Empire
of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions
throughout the world will probably be divided three ways
by Germany, the United States and Japan. In Africa,
Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts
which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given
the greater share of the African colonies. Germany
desires, above all else, to control European Russia."
And, after hearing this defendant, the Ambassador said, and
I quote:
"I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war
campaign is progressing according to schedule, smoothly.
However, suppose that Germany is faced with the
situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual
enemy, but also having all of those areas in which
Britain has influence and those countries which have
been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under
such circumstances, the war area will undergo
considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion
of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"
The defendant Ribbentrop:
"We would like to end this war during next year" - that
is, 1942. "However, under certain circumstances, it is
possible that it will have to be continued on the
following year. Should Japan become engaged in a war
against the United States" -
THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast.
"We would like to end this war during next year.
However, under certain circumstances it is possible that
it will have to be continued into the following year.
That document associates this defendant in the closest
possible way with the aggression by Japan against the United
States.
"The Japanese Ambassador says: 'At 1 p.m. to-day - the
8th December - I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy
issue formal declarations of war on America
Then, as a matter of fact, as the Tribunal are aware, on the
11th December, 1941, the defendant Ribbentrop, in the name
of the German Government, announced a state of war between
Germany and the United States.
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a
telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of
his Government, to the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs the following:
And then, in the middle of the next paragraph, this
defendant returns to the attack. The third sentence - it
begins on the fourth line - says:
"However, it would be more correct that all the powers,
allied in the Three Power Pact, should combine their
forces to defeat England and America, but also, Russia
together. It is not good when one part must fight
alone."
Then the pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown again
in the next document, 2929-PS, which was put in as Exhibit
USA 159. And, in closing this part of the case, if I may, I
will read that. It is very short.
"The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed
again that without any doubt this year presented the
most favourable opportunity for Japan, if she felt
strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at
her disposal, to attack Russia, who certainly would
never again be as weak as she is at the moment" - the
moment being 18th April, 1943.
If the Tribunal please, that concludes my evidence on the
second allegation dealing with aggressive war, and I submit
that the allegation in the Indictment is more than amply
proved.
"Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy
Chief of W.F.S.T. in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the
6th June, that a conference on this question had been
held shortly before between the Reich Marshal, the
defendant Goering; the Reich Foreign Minister, the
defendant von Ribbentrop; and the Reichsfuehrer S.S.
Himmler. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the
Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type
of terror attack on the German civilian population, that
is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the
above conference that only strafing attacks, aimed
directly at the civilian population and their property,
should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a
criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to
be the rule. There was, however, no question of trial by
court martial or handing over to the police."
That is to say, this defendant was pressing that even where
there was an attack on a German city, the airmen should be
handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The others were
saying that such action should be restricted to cases where
there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the
civilian population.
"Deputy Chief of the W.F.S.T. mentioned that, apart from
lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for
segregating those enemy aviators who are suspected of
criminal action of this kind, until they are received
into the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel; if
the suspicion were confirmed, they would be handed over
to the S.D. for special treatment."
As I understand that, it means that if they were not lynched
under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be
kept apart from prisoners of war, where they would, of
course, be subject to the Protecting Powers' intervention.
And if the suspicion were confirmed, they would be handed
over to the S.D. to be killed.
"At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch,
representing the C.-in-C., Air Force, on the 6th June,
it was settled that the following actions were to be
regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law:
These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as this
defendant had suggested, cases where there was merely the
bombing of a city.
"Remarks by the Chief of the O.K.W. on the agenda dated
6th June, 1944."
The number thereon is that of the document at which the
Tribunal has just been looking.
"Most secret; Staff Officers only.
That is signed by Keitel.
"This conference is insufficient. The following points
must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the
Foreign Office:
It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this
defendant and the Foreign Office were fully aware of these
breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the
clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there
were breaches of laws and usages of war is furthered by the
next document-728-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 152.
That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by
the defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his
officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by
this defendant is specifically stated in the next document,
740-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB 153. I do not think
this document has been read before, and therefore, again, I
would like to read just one or two passages in it. It
begins:
Is R.R. in agreement with point 3 (b)?
2. How should the procedure be carried out?
(a) By the people?
3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also
carried out against other enemy aviators?
(b) By the authorities?
4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
"In spite of the obvious objections, based on
International Law and foreign politics, the Foreign
Office is basically in agreement with the proposed
measures.