Fifty-Sixth Day: Monday,11th February, 1946
[Page 249]
I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the
Soviet prosecution, which characterise the espionage measures
undertaken by the Fascist conspirators in preparation for war against
the Soviet Union.
Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Case
"Barbarossa," were, as we know, determined by a directive from the
Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to Counter-
Intelligence on 6th September, 1940, and signed by the defendant Jodl.
This document, presented by the American prosecution as Document 1229-
PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document book. I do
not intend to quote from this document again, but I do consider it
essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organisations
demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany's Eastern front should
be camouflaged in every possible way and
[Page 250]
that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action
of some kind was brewing against the Balkans.
The activities of the intelligence organisations were strictly
regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far
as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an
impression of insignificant concentrations in the North of the Eastern
provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very
considerable concentrations of forces in the Southern part, in the
Protectorate and in Austria.
The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of
the number of anti-aircraft units and of the insignificant extent of
road-building activities, etc.
I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations.
According to Pieckenbrock's testimony, the intensification of the work
of these intelligence organisations against the Soviet Union began
prior to the appearance of this directive in August, 1940. And this
work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information
on the regrouping of forces from West to East.
I beg you, your Honours, to revert to the testimony which I have
already presented, of the former Chief of Abwehr III of the
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services of the German Army, von
Bentivegny.
On Pages 1, 2 and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegny's deposition, it
is said -- I quote the passage (underlined in blue pencil) beginning
at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document, which corresponds to
Page 37 of the document book:
(a) Preparation of all links of 'Abwehr III' (Counter-
Intelligence, Department III) for carrying out active counter-
intelligence work against the Soviet Union, as, for instance the
creation of the necessary counter-intelligence groups, their
distribution among various fighting units intended for taking
part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralysing the
activity of the Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence
organs.
(b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence
agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in
relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow
against Great Britain.
(c) Counter-intelligence measures to keep secret the preparations
being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the
transfer of troops to the East be kept secret."
[Page 251]
for the realisation of Case "Barbarossa." I would refer you to Page
35 of the document book, the 2nd paragraph from the top. This
corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock's testimony. Pieckenbrock
states:
I, personally, as head of Abwehr I, from February, 1941, to 22nd
June, 1941, more than once had official talks with the head of
the Foreign Armies Department of the General Staff, Lieutenant-
General Tiepelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign
Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These conversations dealt with the
more precise definition of various tasks assigned to Abwehr, with
regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the
verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and
also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during
the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union."
Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was
appointed to direct Operation 'Wally I.' Later, when following
our example, 'Abwehr II' and 'Abwehr III' had also established
staffs, 'Wally II' and 'Wally III,' these agencies became known
as a whole staff , 'Wally,' and directed the entire intelligence,
counter-intelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R.
At the head of staff 'Wally' was Colonel Schmalschlaeger."
These points are here clarified by the testimony of a former Colonel
of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen's deputy in Abwehr
II of of the German Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Services attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.
Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the
Tribunal as evidence
[Page 252]
Stolze's testimony of 25th December, 1945, which was given to
Lieutenant-Colonel Burashnikov, of the Counter-Intelligence Service of
the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR 231
with the request that it be accepted as evidence. I will read into the
record individual extracts from this testimony, which are underlined
in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document
book. Stolze testified as follows:
At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with
it, and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came
from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and was signed by
Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl -- or General Warlimont on
Keitel's instructions, I do not quite remember which -- and which
contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive
activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R., after Germany's
attack on the Soviet Union. The order in question was for the
first time marked with the code name 'Barbarossa.'" [Page 253] [
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(Part 12 of 14)
[MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA continues] "As early as November, 1940, I received from Canaris orders to
intensify the work for counter-intelligence in the localities
where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet-German
frontier was taking place."
On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, paragraph 1,
Bentivegny continues:
"In accordance with this order, I immediately gave the branches
of the German military intelligence and counter-intelligence,
Abwehrstelle Koenigsberg, Cracow, Breslau, Vienna, Danzig, and
Poznan, the task of intensifying the countere-intelligence work."
And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39
of the document book, I read:
"In March, 1941, I received from Canaris the following directives
for the preparations for the execution of the Plan "Barbarossa."
The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation
of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Abwehr I of
the German Army, Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in
evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the
activities of the Intelligence Service of the German Army in
connection with the preparations
"In March, 1941, I was present at a conversation between 'Abwehr
II,' Colonel Lahousen, about measures connected with Case
'Barbarossa.' During this conversation they kept referring to a
written order on this subject, which Lahousen had.
I now omit one paragraph and read further:
"The field offices of the 'Abwehrstelle,' which were working
against Russia, were given the task of intensifying the dispatch
of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task -- the intensification
of espionage work against Russia -- was given to all intelligence
agencies existing in the armies and army groups. For the most
successful direction of all these 'Abwehr' agencies, a special
intelligence staff was created in May, 1941, under the code name
of 'Wally I.'
I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock's statement on
Page 36 of the document book:
"From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen to Canaris, at
which I was also present, I know that a great deal of preparatory
work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this
department. In the period of February to May, 1941, many
conferences of the leaders of 'Abwehr II' took place at the
quarters of Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a
cavalry school, in the small town of Krampnitz. One particular
question settled at these conferences in accordance with the
needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special
task units, 'Brandenburg 800,' and of distributing contingents of
these units among the individual Army Groups."
In Pieckenbrock's testimony which has just been read into the record,
special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with
which Lahousen's department had been entrusted, and to special task
units known under the code name of 'Brandenburg 800.'
"I received instructions from Lahousen to organise and to lead a
special group under code name 'A,' which had to engage in the
preparation of diversionary activities, and in the work of
disintegration of the Soviet rearguard, in connection with the
intended attack on the U.S.S.R.
I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on:
"It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of
delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, 'Abwehr
II,' in conducting subversive work against Russia, must use its
agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the
Soviet Union."
I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document
book, on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, to note the
following passages in his testimony:
"In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and
Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian Nationalists who were in the German
Intelligence Service and other members of the Nationalist Fascist
groups, whom I enlisted in to carry out the tasks as set out
above.
In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the
leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the German Agents Myelnik
(code name 'Consul I') and Bandara to organise, immediately upon
Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke
demonstrations in the Ukraine, in order to disrupt the immediate
rear of the Soviet Armies, and also to convince international
public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear. We
also prepared special diversionist groups for subversive
activities in the Baltic Soviet Republics."
I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the
document book, beginning with the third line from the top, you will
find Stolze's testimony:
"Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for
subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty
training regiment `Brandenburg 800,' under the immediate command
of the head of `Abwehr II,' Lahousen. Among the objects of this
special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally
important points, such as bridges, tunnels and defence
installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance
units of the German Army.
At the same time, contrary to the international rules governing the
conduct of war, the personnel of this regiment, composed mainly of
Germans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms
and equipment in order to camouflage their operations:
During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on the
U.S.S.R., the command of the 'Brandenburg 800' regiment also
collected
supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment and arms, and organised
separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian
language."