Fifty-Seventh Day: Tuesday, 12th February, 1946
In March, 1941 Eberhard Kinzel, a colonel of the German
General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit
was to make final arrangements for the attack on Yugoslavia.
[Page 292]
This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter (Page 5 of
the Russian text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152
of the document book):
The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest
of a German delegation, headed by Lieutenant-General
Paulus, for discussing combined operations and the
movement of German troops against Yugoslavia through
Hungarian territory.
In reply to this letter General Werth issued an
invitation to the German delegation, held out prospects
of Hungary's participation in the war against
Yugoslavia and of mobilising, for this purpose, three
Army Corps, i.e., I, IV and V.
Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in
principle, promising at least to mobilise Army Corps
VIII, Kopitze, as well as the mechanized tactical units
demanded by Halder.
I was informed personally about this exchange of
correspondence by Colonel of the German General Staff,
Kinzel."
It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely
cumulative. It doesn't add anything in the least to what you
have already given us, and you could go on to the next
document, which is No. USSR 150. Everything up to there is
simply the negotiations between members of the German and
Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the
Hungarian Army were to be used.
MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that
the presentation of the documents on this question should be
restricted.
THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?
MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain
information pertaining not only to the number of units
pledged by Hungary to Germany in case of war with the Soviet
Union; but there is, for example, an indication as to what
methods in the preparation for war were being used by the
Fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite
conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these
methods, and that is why I request your permission to quote
certain passages in this document.
What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification
of the information regarding the number of Soviet units
concentrated on the Hungarian border.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.
MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as
follows:
[Page 293]
Ujszaszy states (Page 10, Line 4 from the top of the
document, Page 157 of the document book):
a) Lieutenant General Fuetterer and the German
propaganda machine publicised this bombing on a very
vast scale.
b) Lieutenant-General Laszlo immediately gave me
orders, through the Propaganda Sub-section of Section 2
of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to obtain
photographs of such fragments of the 'Soviet Russian
bombs' as could still be found and to publish these
photographs in the Press of the Fascist countries.
c) Lieutenant-General Fuetterer, Major-General Laszlo,
and Lieutenant-General Frimond spread, by a whispering
campaign, the rumour that Slovakian pilots in Russian
Service had bombed Roschitze. The accuracy of the hits
was explained by the fact that these pilots were well
acquainted with the terrain."
The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains
the depositions of Ruskizai-Ruediger explains the reasons
for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be
that Ruskizai-Ruediger's viewpoint is not shared by
everybody, but still, as it is the testimony of the
Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this statement cannot, of
course, be without interest.
On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruskizai-
Ruediger
states that towards the end of May, 1941, he received an
order to supply, first of all, the troops concentrated in
the Transcarpathian Ukraine; two days afterwards a secret
meeting took place of the Army Corps Commanders, at the
headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff,
at which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was
announced.
[Page 294]
I quote from the testimony of Ruskizai-Ruediger (Page 108 of
the document book and Page 9 of the document itself). I am
only quoting the passages underlined, in order to save time:
It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by
Germany is forthcoming, in which Roumania and Hungary
will take an active part on the side of Germany."
These decisions caused no surprise, and were the result
of the voluntary military collaboration with Germany
which had actually existed for many years past.
The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders
of Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression
against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their
mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards
followed the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine and
the strategic organisation of this region as a military
base in preparation for an attack on Soviet Russia."
The former Lieutenant-General of the German Army, Guenther
Krappe, was the German Military Attache in Budapest from
November, 1939, to 30th April, 1941.
After that, Krappe commanded the 10th Corps of S.S. troops
of the Army Group "Vistula," and was captured by Red Army
units.
I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement
made by Krappe in January of this year and presented as
Exhibit USSR 150. It should be noted that the main facts
mentioned in Krappe's statement coincide with those on
Ujszaszy's report.
I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page 4 of
Krappe's document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document
book:
General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile
trip through Mukashevo to Ujoksky Pass. I communicated
the results of the inspection tour and of the
information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin.
Some time later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the
necessary sum for the building of these fortifications
had already been allotted."
[Page 295]
to establish jointly with the postal services, a special
communication system for military requirements, and,
furthermore, a number of German officers were attached to
the Hungarian Army for the mutual exchange of experience and
instruction. Krappe states that as from December, 1940,
Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the
increase of the German military potential. General Leeb, the
Chief of the Armament Department, was in charge.
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(Part 17 of 18)
[MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA continues] "Colonel Kinzel arrived in Budapest in March, 1941,
bringing with him a letter from General Halder to
General Werth. This letter contained an urgent request
on the part of Germany that Hungary should participate
in the possible war against Yugoslavia by mobilizing
the following Army Corps: I. Budapest, II.
Szekesfehervar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pecs, V. Szeged,
and in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15
operational units, including one cavalry division, two
mechanized brigades, and one mountain (rifle) brigade.
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see
that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal
whether Hungary was going to put one Army Corps, or two Army
Corps, or three Army Corps against the Russians. It was
absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we are
to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December, 1940,
was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany's disposal,
for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it
matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units?
"My immediate superior, Major-General Laszlo, as Chief
of the Operational Group, ordered the Second Section of the
General Staff to prepare a situation report according
to which fourteen Soviet Russian operational units were
concentrated on the Hungarian border, including eight
motorized units. This situation report was prepared by
Colonel Cornell Hidai, of Intelligence.
I should like to point out that according to subsequent
explanations supplied by the Second Section of the
Royal Hungarian General Staff, there were only four
Soviet operational units actually concentrated on the
Hungarian border. This circumstance I truthfully
reported to General Werth and Major-General Laszlo, but
the latter altered my truthful, objective report in
accordance with his wishes."
Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up
by the militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of
creating incidents abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet
Union.
"These plans emanated from Lieutenant-General
Fuetterer, from his assistant Lieutenant-Colonel
Frimond, and from Major-General Laszlo. They proposed
that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged as
Russian planes, should bomb the Eastern border
districts of Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian
origin."
And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days
preceding the attack on the Soviet Union (this is Page 11 of
the document, Page 158 of the document book):
"On 24th June, 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30
p.m., I was informed that Soviet Russian planes were
bombing Rahivo in Carpathian Russia and firing on
trains in the vicinity with machine-gun fire. On the
same afternoon news reached us that Soviet Russian
planes were bombing Roschitze. The Crown Council, with
the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening and,
'on the strength of Soviet Russia's provocation,'
decided to declare war on that country. I am convinced
that the bombarding was carried out by German planes
with Russian markings. My conclusion was based on the
following facts:
This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24th June, 1941, at
12:30 p.m. We have a document that establishes the fact that
long before this date the participation of Hungary in the
war against the Soviet Union had been decided.
"General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, gave us an
account of the military and political situation.
Ruskizai-Ruediger further points out that:
"The decision to declare war was taken by the Council
of Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Barta
had made their reports, and was ratified by the Crown
Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament.
Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German Military
Attache in Budapest, Krappe.
"In October, 1940, I was ordered by the O.K.H. to
report on the conditions of fortifications in the
region bordering Russia, that is, in the Carpathian
Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel
Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were only
simple anti-tank obstacles in existence, varying in
depth from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction
of barracks had just begun. The necessary surveys for
erecting concrete pillboxes along the border and the
highways would be made during the winter, and in the
spring of 1941 it would be possible to proceed with the
actual construction. It appeared to be a question of
raising some 6,000,000 pengos.
In order to save time, Your Honours, I shall briefly
summarise the remaining part of Krappe's testimony: an
agreement was reached with the War Minister, Barta, to
organize war communications and war transports of the German
Army in Hungary. A special mission arrived which was
entrusted with these transports. At the same time, your
Honours, permission was received