One-Hundred-and-Twelfth Day:
Tuesday, 23rd April, 1946 [Page 176]
After that report by Brigadefuehrer Stroop - Exhibit USA-275
should be inserted as Page 16A, the affidavit by S.S.
Brigadefuehrer Stroop which was submitted during the cross-
examination of the defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner, under
Exhibit USA-804. That affidavit bears the number 3481-PS. I
could
[Page 177]
As Page 16B another document should be put in, which was
also submitted during the cross-examination of Dr.
Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That
affidavit is Exhibit USA-803, Document 3840-PS. That would
be Page 16B of the document book.
Now I come to the report which the Soviet prosecutor had in
mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish
question in Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book.
That measure has the Exhibit number USA-277 and the Document
number 18-L. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word:
The material compiled for this purpose by S.S.
Obergruppenfuehrer Kruger has already been submitted to
you directly. On the basis of this material, I have had a
report prepared which sums up the most important points
of this material, sub-divides them clearly, and
culminates in an exposition of the measures to be taken.
The report has been checked with S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer
Kruger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting
a part of it to you herewith."
I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:
The German administration in the Government General has
to fulfil the following tasks:
To increase agricultural production and seize as much of
it as possible for the purpose of securing food for the
German people, to allot sufficient rations to the native
population occupied with work essential to the war
effort, and to carry off the rest for the armed forces
and the homeland." [Page 178]
(1) The spirit of the German administration in the
Government General.
From the beginning it has been the endeavour of the
Governor General to create a State organisation out of
the Government General which was to lead its own
existence in complete independence of the Reich."
(4) The relationship between racial Germans and the
Polish- Ukrainian population in the Government General.
The cases are numerous in which the German administration
has permitted the requirements of the racial Germans in
the Government General to be put into the background in
favour of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in
its endeavour to win over t1he latter. The opinion was
advanced that racial Germans resettled from somewhere
else were not to be installed immediately as settlers,
but for the duration of the war were only to be employed
as farm workers. A legal foundation for the expropriation
of Polish property has not been created so far. Bad
treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was
not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients
were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish
physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in
the Government General the sheltering of children of
German citizenship from territories which were threatened
with bombing and Stalingrad fighters was hampered, while
foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.
The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for
the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out
with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the
Strengthening of German Nationality had found the
administration willing to co-operate and assist in the
proper manner."
[Page 179]
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which
begins on Page 20?
DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page
27. I have already finished the report which begins on Page
20.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on
Page 20?
DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the
letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the
Exhibit USA- 175.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.
DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a
memorandum which has already been mentioned by various
witnesses, and was submitted under Exhibit USA-610 by the
prosecution. Of this report, the prosecution has only read
Pages 10 and 11, on Pages 36 and 37 of the document book,
that is to say, only those passages in the report which
concerned excesses of the police, and against which excesses
the Governor General complained to the Fuehrer.
I do not intend to read the whole memorandum, but I will
pass on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the
document book, and I quote under No. 2:
(3) The closing of colleges, high schools and secondary
schools is on the same level. Its considered purpose is
without doubt the lowering of the Polish educational
standard. The realisation of this goal appears, from the
point of view of the necessities of war, not always
beneficial to German interests. As the war goes on the
German interest in the mobilisation of able foreign
replacements in the various fields of knowledge
increases. But more important than that is the fact that
the crippling of the school system, and the severe
hampering of cultural activities, foster the growth [Page 180]
(4) The recruiting of labour and the methods employed,
even though often exercised under the inescapable
pressure of circumstances, have, with the aid of clever
Bolshevist agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred
among all classes. The workers thus obtained often come
to work with a firm resolve to engage in positive
resistance, even active sabotage. Improvement of
recruiting methods, together with the continued effort to
arrest the abuses still practised in the treatment of
Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision,
however meagre it may be for the families left behind,
would cause a rise in morale, and the result would be an
increased desire to work, and increased production in the
German interest.
(5) When the German administration was set up at the
beginning of the war the Polish element was removed from
all important positions. The available German staff had
always been quantitatively and qualitatively
insufficient. Besides, during the past year a
considerable number of German personnel has had to be
transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed
forces. Already an increased amount of non-German
manpower has had to be obtained compulsorily. An
essential change in the treatment of the Poles would
enable the administration, while exercising all necessary
precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to
collaborate. Failing this the administration, having in
view the present amount of personnel, not to speak of
future transfers, cannot be kept working. The increased
participation of Poles would further help to raise the
morale itself.
Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals,
a number of methods employed up till now in the treatment
of Poles require to be changed or even completely
abandoned, at least for the duration of the fighting in
Europe.
(1) I have already shown in special reports that
confiscation and evacuation of agricultural land have
caused great and irreparable damage to agricultural
production. Not less great is the damage to morale caused
by such actions. The seizure alone of a great part of the
large Polish estates naturally has embittered those
affected by it, a class which represents that strata of
the population which is always anti-Bolshevik. But their
opposition does not count nearly as much, because of
their numerically small strength and their complete
isolation from the mass of the people, as the attitude of
the mass of the population consisting mainly of small
farmers. The evacuation of Polish peasants from the
defence zone, no doubt necessary for military-political
reasons, has already had an unfavourable effect on the
mentality and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this
evacuation was kept within certain territorial limits. It
was carried out with careful preparation on the part of
the governmental offices with a view to avoiding
unnecessary hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers
from the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the
Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German
Nationality, for the purpose of settling racial Germans
there, was much more serious. Moreover - as I already
reported separately - the pace at which it was carried
out, and [Page 181]
(2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to
become obvious that the safeguarding of personal security
is an absolute condition for the winning over the Polish
population in the fight against Bolshevism. The lack of
protection against seemingly arbitrary arrests and
executions makes good copy for Communist propaganda and
slogans. The shooting of women, children and old men in
public, which took place again and again without the
knowledge and against the will of the leadership, must be
prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not
apply to the public executions of bandits and partisans.
In cases of collective punishments, which nearly always
hit innocent persons, and are applied against people who
are fundamentally politically indifferent, the
unfavourable psychological effect cannot possibly be
overestimated. Serious punitive measures and executions
should only be carried out after a trial based at least
upon the elementary conceptions of justice and
accompanied by publication of the sentence. Even if the
court procedure is carried on in a simple, imperfect and
improvised manner, it serves to avoid or to lessen the
unfavourable effect of a punitive measure which the
population considers purely arbitrary, and disarms
Bolshevist agitation which claims that these German
measures are only the prelude to future events. Moreover,
collective punishment, which by its nature is directed
primarily against the innocent, in the worst cases
against forced or desperate persons, is not exactly
looked upon as a sign of strength of the ruling power,
which the population expects will strike at the
terrorists themselves and thereby liberate the population
from the insecurity which burdens them."
[Page 182]
(4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the
Poles, importance must be attached to the influence of
the Catholic Church which cannot be over-estimated. I do
not deny that the Catholic Church has always been on the
side of the leading fighters for an independent national
Poland. Numerous clergymen also made their influence felt
in this direction even after the German occupation.
Hundreds of arrests were also carried out among them. A
number of priests were taken to concentration camps and
also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish
population the Church must be given at least a legal
status even though it might not be possible to co-
operate. It can without doubt be won over to reinforce
the struggle of the Polish people against Bolshevism,
especially today under the effect of the crime of Katyn,
for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist regime in
the Vistula area if only from the instinct of self
preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is
necessary to refrain in the future from all measures
against its activity and its property, in so far as they
do not run directly counter to war requirements.
Much harm has been done even quite recently by the
closing of monasteries, charitable institutions and
church establishments" - [
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(Part 9 of 10)
"After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews
had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their
employers by providing them with goods in scarce supply,
etc., it was considered necessary to introduce really
Draconic measures."
I pass to paragraph 2 and quote:
"Since the administration was not in a position and
showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the S.S.
and Police Leader simply took over the whole question of
the employment of Jewish labour. The Jewish labour
agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of Jews, were
dissolved. All certificates of labour given by firms or
administrative offices were declared invalid, and the
cards given to the Jews by the labour agencies were
revalidated by being stamped by the police offices."
I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the
letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery to the Reich Fuehrer S.S. and Chief of the
German Police Himmler, of 17 April, 1943. That document has
the number 2220-PS and the Exhibit No. USA-175. I quote:
"In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed
to prepare written memoranda about conditions in the
Government General, on which to base our intended report
to the Fuehrer.
It is signed "Dr. Lammers."
"Secret, concerning conditions in the Government General
...
I leave out the following points and pass to the letter "B,"
where Kruger or his assistant criticised the measures of the
Governor General.
"German administration in the Government General has
failed extensively with respect to the tasks listed under
'A.' Even if a relatively high percentage, namely over 90
per cent., of the delivery quota of agricultural products
for the armed forces and the homeland was successfully
met in the year 1942, and if the labour procurement
requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied,
nevertheless, on the other hand two things must be made
clear: First, these accomplishments were achieved for
the first time in the year 1942. Before that, for
example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been
delivered for the armed forces. Secondly, and above all,
one had failed to create for the attainment of such
performances those prerequisites of an organisational,
economic, and political character which are indispensable
if such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in
the situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions
in every respect could eventually come about. This
failure of the German administration can be explained for
one thing by the system of the German administrative and
governmental activity in the Government General as
embodied in the Governor General, and secondly by the
misguided principles of policy in all those questions
which are decisive for conditions in the Government
General.
Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, No. 3 and I quote:-
"(3) The treatment of the native population can only be
led in the right direction on the basis of clean and
orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such
a foundation makes it possible to handle the native
population strictly and, if necessary, even severely on
the one hand, and on the other hand to act generously
with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction in
the population by certain liberties, especially in the
cultural field. Without such a foundation, severity
strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the
population halfway only undermines respect for the
Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this
foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this
foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of
encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish
population, which in itself is already overshooting the
goal, but which, under the existing conditions and viewed
in connection with our military situation during the past
winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and must
achieve the opposite of the aim intended.
I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:-
"The administrative system, represented by the Governor
General personally, and the material failure of the
general German administration
in the most various fields of decisive importance, has
not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of
the native population, but has also brought about the
result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and
constantly disunited throughout their history, have come
together in a united national body through their
hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretence, the
real foundations are lacking on which alone those
achievements which the Reich requires from the Government
General, and those aims which it must see realised
through the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in
the long run. The non-fulfilment of the tasks given to
the general administration, as happened, for example, in
the field of the Strengthening of German Nationality, led
to a condition which made it necessary for other
administrative bodies (Reich Commissioner for the
Strengthening of German Nationality, and the Police) to
take over these tasks."
Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the
repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the
Fuehrer of 19 June, 1943. The document has the number 437-
PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the prosecution has so
far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points
in the memorandum by the Governor General which were most
severely condemned.
"The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities
for participation in the cultural field has led, even
among the lowest classes of the Polish people, to
considerable discontent. The Polish middle and upper
classes have a great need for self-expression. Experience
shows that the possibility of cultural activity would at
the same time mean a diversion from the political
questions of the day. German propaganda frequently meets
with the objection on the part of the Poles, that the
restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German
authorities not only prevents the contrast being made
with the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that
Polish cultural activity falls below the degree of
culture allowed to Soviet citizens.
of a Polish national body led by the intelligentsia to
conspire against Germany. What was not possible during
the course of Polish national history, what even the
first years of German dominion could not bring about,
namely the achievement of national unity in a common
purpose, to hold together through thick and thin, now
threatens to become a reality, slowly but surely, because
of the German measures. The German leadership cannot pass
unheeded this process of unifying the individual classes
of the Polish population into a growing power of
resistance of the Poles. The German leadership should
promote class distinction by certain cultural concessions
and should be able to play one class off against the
other.
the methods adopted, caused immeasurable bitterness among
the populace. At short notice families were torn apart,
those able to work were sent to the Reich while old
people and children were directed to empty Jewish
ghettos. This happened in the middle of the winter of
1942-43 and resulted in considerable loss of life,
especially among members of the last-mentioned group. The
dispossession meant the complete expropriation of movable
and immovable property of the farmers. The entire
population succumbed to the belief that these
deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of
the Poles from the region of the Government General. The
general impression was that the Poles would meet a fate
similar to that of the Jews. The evacuation from the
Lublin district was a welcome opportunity for Communist
agitation, which skilfully poisoned the minds of the
people against the Government General, even in the
annexed Eastern Territories, for a long time. Thus it
came about that considerable portions of the population
in the territories to be evacuated, and also in
territories not affected, fled into the woods and greatly
increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence
was a tremendous deterioration of the security situation.
These people, driven to despair, are incited by skilful
agents to upset agricultural and industrial production
according to a definite plan.
I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under No. 3:-
"Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in
(1) and (2) to restore calm in the Government General,
security of property among the non-agricultural people
must also be guaranteed, in so far as it is not run
counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation or
confiscation without compensation in the industrial
sector, in commerce and trade and of other private
property, should not take place in any case, if the owner
or the custodian has not committed an offence against the
German authorities. If the taking over of industrial
enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is
necessary for reasons connected with the war, one should
proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship
and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a
procedure would, on the one hand,
further the initiative of Polish business men and, on the
other hand, avoid damage to the interests of German war
economy.