The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)
Nuremberg, war crimes, crimes against humanity

The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany
14th May to 24th May, 1946

One Hundred and Thirty-Sixth Day: Wednesday, 22nd May, 1946
(Part 8 of 11)

[MAJOR ELWYN JONES continues his cross examination of Erich Schulte-Monting]

[Page 303]


Q. If you will look at that document, witness, you will see in the second sentence

"It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions are to be examined-"
And then there follow these questions
"What places in Norway can be considered as bases?"

"Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?"

"What are the possibilities of defence after the occupation?"

"Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or might they have decisive advantages simply as supply centres? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats during temporary stops.)"

And then finally
"What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, e.g., Skagen?"
Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?

A. No, I don't see any aggressive intentions in these purely operational plans, which merely represent consideration as to what bases might come into operation for the conduct of the war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, General Admiral Karls as early as September, sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed his concern, and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.

Q. The source of the information which the defendant Raeder was receiving was discussed by you this morning, but one source that you did not give was the

[Page 304]

Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not?

A. There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling until December, 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life and never saw him again.

Q. But after December, Quisling's agent, Hagelin, was a very frequent visitor to the defendant Raeder, was he not?

A. I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder before Quisling's visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.

Q. Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?

A. No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement.

Q. Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the C.-in-C. of the Navy in Berlin -

A. I did not quite catch the name.

Q. Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a - Part of his duties were to receive the visitors of the C.-in-C. He was assistant adjutant, and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. No doubt you recollect the man.

A. Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to me; I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?

Q. This is a German subject, an employee of the High Command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the C.-in-C.'s visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up the list of callers. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB 479.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: Not yet, my Lord.

THE WITNESS: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking was in the reception-room of the Adjutant's office. It was not for him to say who was to be admitted to the Grand Admiral, that was my job. I asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling's visit, that is, not before December 1939.


Q. I am not suggesting that, but what I am suggesting is that after December 1939, there was a very close link between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I will just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, my Lord, of the English text:

"I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Commanderin-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman, whose name I cannot recall at present, through a Party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief at once. I then soon learned from the minute book and from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him also conversed with me, and confided in me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder, and met with Hitler's most joyous approval. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretence of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling too was announced at the Commander-in-Chief's through Hagelin, and was received immediately. Lieutenant Commander Schreiber of the Naval Reserve, who was later Naval Attache in Oslo, and knew the conditions in

[Page 305]

Norway very well, also played a role in all these negotiations. He worked with the Quisling Party and its agents in Oslo."
A. It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Grand Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any information about that, because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had, perhaps, noted down that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is, that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass through Berlin again, and he had any naval political information in this connection, I should like him to make this information available to me.

Q. Are you saying that defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?

A. He did not meet him before Quisling's visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.

Q. But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on 14th December, 1939, did he not?

A. He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone.

Q. You said - You spoke this morning as to a conference between Quisling and Raeder on 12th December, 1939, and suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.

A. By the word "politics" I mean politics in the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the Norwegian side, and on our side. The matters discussed were only Naval political questions.

Q. But I will not go into a discussion of the question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that war is a continuation of politics, by other means. But if you look at the Document C-64, you will see that political problems were discussed on 12th December. You see that it is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document Book 10 A, in which Raeder writes in paragraph 2:

"As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the Storthing (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway; in which case, Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very imminent. From 11th January, 1940, on, the Storthing, and thereby the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional, since the Storthing, in defiance of the constitution, has prolonged its term for a year."
Politics were very much under discussion at that conference, were they not? You have said that the defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?

A. In reply to your first question, I should like to say that in the minutes it says:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that, in connection with such offers, we can never know to what extent the persons involved want to further their own Party aims, and to what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence caution is required."
This entry in the document which you have just presented to me, corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be settled between Grand Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason, I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the factor of caution, and asks: "What does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof from these things?"

Q. At any rate, the defendant, Raeder, preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo, which were entirely different. That is so, is it not?

[Page 306]

A. I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate, do not know these reports.

Q. Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan's intention to attack the United States?

A. I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbour.

Q. But you had received a communication from your German Naval Attache at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbour, indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, had you not?

A. Pearl Harbour? No.

Q. But against the United States Forces. Just look at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB 480. You see that those are extracts from the War Diary of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3rd December, 1941:

"1800 hours. The Naval Attache extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be regarded as having broken down completely, and that, quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the South by the Japanese armed forces is to be expected in the near future."
And then on 6th December, 1941: "Conversation with Commander Shiba." The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following telegram:
"1. Last week, America proposed a non-aggression pact between the United States, Britain, Russia and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact, and the high counter-demands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down."

"2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu being sent only to impress the people with the fact that no stone had been left unturned."

"3. The Armed Forces have already decided three weeks ago that war is inevitable, even if the United States, at the last minute, should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are under way."

And then - I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says:
"A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist by Christmas."
Assuming that signal reached you before 8th December, you became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, did you not?

A. I don't quite follow the sense. I have already said that we in Berlin had no contact with the Japanese experts or attaches. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbour incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6th December the Attache in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America.

Q. Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with the Japanese Attaches.

A. To my knowledge, there were no official conferences between the two Admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operational Staff and the Japanese Admiralty Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Elwyn Jones, before you leave that document, I think you ought to read paragraph 5.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: Paragraph 5, my Lord, reads:

[Page 307]

"No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the Southern Offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within three weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and Borneo.

"The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents."

Now I want to -

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do not know whether I understood him rightly before, but what I took down was that he said the German Admiralty first knew of Japan's intention to attack after Pearl Harbour, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbour by radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That is so, my Lord.

Q. I am suggesting to you, witness, that you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbour.

A. I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbour, or the fact that two days before the attack on it, we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be expected. I was asked whether we knew of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbour, and to that I said: "No." I said that we in Berlin had had no conferences between the Naval Operational Staff and the Japanese Naval Staff. What you are presenting to me -

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