One Hundred and Sixty-Third Day:
Tuesday, 25th June, 1946
[Page 186]
A. Yes, still - at that time.
Q. I thought von Fritsch was a friend of yours; was he not?
A. Who?
Q. Colonel-General von Fritsch; he was a friend of yours?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. You did not believe that he had been guilty of
homosexuality, did you?
A. No, never.
Q. Well, did they not - did you not know that he had been
subject in January, 1938, to a framed-up charge?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking
your head.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I knew that, of course, and I learned of
it and the fact that this charge was a fabrication of the
Gestapo, at least in my opinion, but not of Hitler.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Well, did you not know that those - these unsavoury
matters concerning Field-Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel-
General von Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi
gang, who were your colleagues in the Government?
A. Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course.
Q. You see, you remember that at the time of Munich, when
you came back to the field . came back into activity for
some time, President Benes did appeal to this German-
Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the
appeal aside. Do you remember that? In September, 1938?
A. No; that I do not know, for at the time I was not in
office any longer and I did not know of these matters at
all. I do not know about that.
Q. You do not know? Of course, it was in the German Press
and every other Press that he appealed to this Convention
and Hitler refused to listen; but you say that you honestly
believed on 12th March that Hitler would stand by that
Arbitration Treaty; that is what you said?
A. Yes, I had no misgivings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient
moment to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Defendant, you spoke yesterday with regard to the
memorandum of Lieutenant-General Frederici. Do you remember
in that memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on
how to deal with Czechoslovakia?
Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859,
so that the Tribunal can see your attitude towards the
Czechs from your own words.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is at Page 107 of
Document Book 12-A.
[Page 187]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB
520.
Q. (continuing): You say:
From a national-political standpoint there can be but one
aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich;
from an ethnic-political standpoint to fill this
territory with Germans."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is the top of Page 109,
your Lordship's copy.
By and large, the population submit to the new
conditions, but they only do so because they either have
the necessary rational insight or else because they fear
the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not
do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs
for some time to come." "But - " [Page 188]
The most radical and theoretically complete solution of
the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely
from this country and replace them by Germans."
Then, if you go on to paragraph 2, to the second half, you
say ...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is the last six lines
of Page 110.
A. Not quite. Here there are -
Q. But just before you answer, what did you mean by saying,
in the last passage that I read to you:
A. To that I can only say one thing, yes and no. First of
all, I should like to say that from this report it becomes
apparent that the memorandum was written by Frank. I joined
my name to it, and this was on 31st August, 1940. The
memorandum which I ... the memorandum which is referred to
in the Frederici report is from a ... is dated later, I
think, although I do not know off-hand.
Q. I think you will find ... I will give you, in a moment,
the letter from Siemke, who transmits Hitler's view, and I
think you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler
is dealing with. I will show you Frank's memorandum in a
moment. I am suggesting to you now that, as you said to
Lammers, you enclosed your own and another memorandum. I
will read you the essential part of the other one, which is
the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank, in a moment. But this
is a -
A. They are both by Frank.
Q. I will show it ... No, but look at your own letter of
31st August: "Enclosed I send you the memorandum," and you
go on: "I enclose another memorandum ... which my State
Secretary K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me ...
with which I fully agree." I am suggesting to you that you
know that this is your memorandum, referred to in the
Frederici document
[Page 189]
Q. (continuing): - where General Frederici says: "After
ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view
about the various plans in a memorandum." I am suggesting to
you that this is your memorandum which you sent on to
Lammers for submission to the Fuehrer. Are you saying - are
you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is not your
memorandum?
A. No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I
really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I
agreed with its contents. The letter to Lammers says so.
Q. Well, now, if you agreed with its contents, what else did
you mean by saying that you would have to expel the
intelligentsia, except that you were going to break down the
Czechs as a national entity and expel the people who would
keep going that history and tradition and language? Is that
not why you wanted to expel the intelligentsia?
A. I never mentioned the word "destroy," but said that the
intelligentsia -
Q. I said "expel" -
A. I see.
Q. - which is your own word.
A. The intelligentsia class was the greatest obstacle to co-
operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if we
wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the
aim of our policy, then this intelligentsia had to be
reduced in some way and in particular their influence had to
be diminished, and that was the meaning of my explanation.
Q. Yes, you said to achieve your policy, but by achieving
your policy you mean to destroy the Czech people as a
national entity with their own language, history and
traditions, and assimilate them into the Greater German
Reich. That was your policy, was it not?
A. My policy was, first of all, to assimilate the Czechs, as
far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not
have been achieved for generations. The first thing to do
was to bring about co-operation so as to have peace and
order.
Q. Well, now, before - before I put to you the memorandum of
Frank, with which you entirely agree, would you look at
paragraph 7 of your own memorandum.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document
Book 12 A.
Q. (continuing): In Section 7 you say:
The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the
help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres, and
must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key
positions and to taking over the reins of public
administration where the interests of the Reich make it
absolutely necessary."
A. To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was altogether
impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to
incorporate themselves more closely into the Reich, and that
is what I mean by the word "assimilate."
Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum - earlier,
much earlier - that from the racial point of view - if you
want to use that unpleasant expression - there was an
extraordinarily large number of Germans within
Czechoslovakia.
[Page 190]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, your Lordship will find the
beginning of that is Enclosure 2 on Page 115.
Q. (continuing): The State Secretary states his problem. He
says, in the second sentence:
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read the last two lines?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Oh, yes, my Lord, I am sorry.
I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and
Moravia to a territory outside the Reich and the
settlement of Germans in the freed territory or
II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia
and Moravia the simultaneous application of a great
variety of methods working towards Germanisation, in
accordance with plan X.
Such a Germanisation provides for:
2. The expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and
of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich, or
'special treatment' for these and all destructive
elements;
3. The re-colonising of the territory thus freed with
fresh German blood." [
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
(Part 9 of 11)
[SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE continues his cross examination of Constantin von Neurath] "Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum,
which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 13th July,
1940, about the question of the future organization of
the Bohemian-Moravian country. I enclose another
memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of
State K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me and
which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same
result" - I ask you to note the next words - "and with
which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the
Fuehrer and arrange a date for a personal interview for
myself and State Secretary Frank. As I have heard from a
private source that individual Party and other offices
intend to submit proposals to the Fuehrer for separating
various parts of the Protectorate under my authority,
without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be
grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my
interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich
Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to
have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to
place our opinions before the Fuehrer before all sorts of
plans are suggested to him by other people."
Now, I would just like to take what I hope will be the gist
of your own memorandum. If you will turn it over - this is
your memorandum. Take the first paragraph, Section I:
"Any considerations about the future organization of
Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to
be laid down for that territory from a national-political
(staatspolitisch) and ethnic-political (volkspolitisch)
point of view.
And then, if you go on to Section 2, in the middle of
paragraph 2, you will find a sub-paragraph beginning ...
Q. (continuing): "These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4
millions live in towns and communities of over 2,000
inhabitants and 3.8 millions in communities of under
2,000 and in the country, are led and influenced by an
intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion to
the size of the country. This part of the population also
tried, after the alteration of the constitutional
situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage
or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were
intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the
new state of affairs. The remaining part of the
population, small craftsmen, peasants and workmen,
adapted themselves better to the new conditions."
Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say:
"But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this
that the Government and population behaved in this
correct manner because they had inwardly accepted the
loss of their independent state, and their incorporation
into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked
upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread
longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if
the people do not express it openly.
" - as things are like that, a decision will have to be
taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in
order to attain the objective of incorporating the
country and filling it with Germans as quickly and as
thoroughly as possible.
Then you say that that is not possible because there are not
sufficient Germans to fill the country immediately.
Q. (continuing): "It will, where the Czechs are
concerned, rather be a case on the one hand, of keeping
those Czechs who are suitable for Germanisation by
individual selective breeding, while, on the other hand,
expelling those who are not useful from a racial
standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the
intelligentsia which has developed in the last twenty
years. If we use such a procedure, Germanisation can be
carried out successfully."
Now, defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this
trial we are charging you and your fellow-defendants with,
among many other things, genocide, which we say is the
extermination of racial and national groups, or, as it has
been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin:
"a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves."
What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and
writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the
intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history
and traditions of the Czech people to other generations.
These were the people that you wanted to destroy by what you
say in that memorandum, were they not?
"expelling those who are not useful from a racial
standpoint or are enemies of the Reich; that is, the
intelligentsia which has developed during the last twenty
years."
Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when
you said it was necessary to expel the intelligentsia?
"If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German
nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a
careful and rational utilization of Germans will be
apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have
to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful,
well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who are
suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary.
You were, in this memorandum, blue-printing the plans for
dealing with the Czechs after the war on the basis of the
German victory, that is, that they should disappear as a
nation and become assimilated to the German Reich. Was that
not what was in your mind?
"The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a
Reich Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the
Czech problem and should therefore be retained or whether
it should now give place to some other form of government
is being raised by various people and is the cause of
this memorandum. It will briefly:
Well, now, I would like you just to look at your State
Secretary's independent opinion with which you entirely
agree.
(a) indicate the nature of the Czech problem;
(b) analyse the present way in which it is being dealt
with;
(c) examine the proposed alterations from the point of
view of their suitability, and finally
(d) express an independent opinion on the whole
question." "On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech
problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to
come."
Now, my Lord, Frank's own opinion starts on 121 - Page 121
in Section D of the memorandum, and he begins by saying:
"The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be
the complete Germanisation of area and people. In order
to attain this, there are two possibilities:
1. The changing of the nationality of racially suitable
Czechs;