Office of Strategic Services British War Blue Book:
Two difficulties were raised last night before visit to Herr
Hitler was actually arranged. In first place it was asked whether
I would not be ready to wait until Herr von Ribbentrop's return.
I said that I could not wait as my instructions were to hand letter
myself as soon as possible. An hour or so later I was rung up again
by State Secretary on the telephone asking for gist of letter and
referring to publication of some private letter addressed to Herr
Hitler last year. I told Baron von [unreadable] that I had no
recollection of publication of any private letter last year and assured
him that there was no intention of publishing this one. As regards
Prime Minister's letter I said that its three main points were (1) that
His Majesty's Government was determined to fulfill its obligations
to Poland, (2) that they were prepared, provided a peace atmosphere
was created to discuss all problems affecting our two countries, and
(3) that during period of truce they would welcome direct discussions
between Poland and Germany in regard to minorities.
State Secretary appeared to regard these replies as likely to be
satisfactory, but deferred a final answer to 2 a.m. this morning.
At that hour he telephoned me to say that arrangements made
had been confirmed and that he would accompany me to
Berchtesgaden, leaving Berlin at 9:30 a.m.
We arrived Salzburg soon after 11 a.m. and motored to
Berchtesgaden, where I was received by Herr Hitler shortly
after 1 p.m. I had derived impression that atmosphere was
likely to be most unfriendly and that probability was that
interview would be exceedingly brief.
In order to forestall this I began conversation by stating that
I had been instructed to hand to Chancellor personally a
letter from Prime Minister on behalf of His Majesty's
Government, but before doing so I wished to make some
preliminary remarks. I was grateful to his Excellency for
receiving me so promptly as it would have been impossible
for me to wait for Herr von Ribbentrop's return inasmuch
as the fact was that His Majesty's Government were afraid that
the situation brooked no delay. I asked his Excellency to read the
[Page 33]
letter, not from the point of view of the past, but from that
of the present and the future. What had been done could
not now be undone, and there could be no peace in Europe
without Anglo-German cooperation. We had guaranteed
Poland against attack and we would keep our word.
Throughout the centuries of history we had never, so far
as I know, broken our word. We could not do so now and
remain Britain.
During the whole of this first conversation Herr Hitler
was excitable and uncompromising. He made no long
speeches but his language was violent and exaggerated
both as regards England and Poland. He began by asserting
that the Poland situation could have been settled on the
most generous terms if it had not been for England's [unreadable]
support. I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our
[rest of GIF unreadable]
[first half of GIF unreadable]
Following is continuation of my telegram of the 23rd August
After my first talk [unreadable] I returned to Salzburg on
understanding that if Herr Hitler wished to see me again
I would be at his disposal, or, if he had nothing new to say,
he could merely send me his reply to Prime Minister by hand.
As in the event he asked to see me,I went back to Berchtesgaden.
He was quite calm the second time and never raised his voice
once. Conversation lasted about 20 minutes to half an hour
but produced little new, except that verbally he was far more
categoric than in written reply as to his determination to attack
Poland if "another German were ill-treated in Poland."
I spoke of tragedy of war and of his immense responsibility
but his answer was that it would be all England's fault. I
refuted this only to learn from him that England was
determined to destroy and exterminate Germany. He was,
he said, 50 years old: he preferred war now to when he
would be 55 or 60. I told him that it was absurd to talk of
extermination. Nations could not be exterminated and
peaceful and prosperous Germany was a British interest.
His answer was that it was England who was fighting for
lesser races whereas he was fight-
[Page 35]
ing only for Germany: the Germans would this time fight
to the last man: it would have been different in 1914 if he
had been Chancellor then.
He spoke several times of his repeated offers of friendship to
England and their invariable and [unreadable] reaction. I
referred to Prime Minister's effort of last year and his desire for
cooperation with Germany. He said that he had believed in
Mr. Chamberlain's good-will at the time, but, and especially
since encirclement efforts of last few months, he did so no
longer. I pointed out fallacy of this view but his answer was
that he was now fully convinced of the rightness of views
held formerly to him by others that England and Germany
could never agree.
In referring to Russian non-aggression pact he observed
that it was England which had forced him into agreement
with Russia. He did not seem enthusiastic over it but added
that once he made agreement it would be for a long time
period. (Text of agreement signed today confirms this and
I shall be surprised if it is not supplemented later by something
more than mere non-aggression).
I took line at end that was seemed inevitable to me if Herr
Hitler persisted in direct action against Poland and expressed
regret at failure of my mission in general to Berlin and my
visit to him. Herr Hitler's attitude was that it was England's
fault and that nothing short of complete change of her policy
towards Germany could ever convince him of British desire
for good relations.
pp. 130-131
Telegram Sir Neville Henderson to Viscount Halifax,
dated Berlin August 28, 1939
I saw the Chancellor at 10:30 this evening. He asked me to
come at 10 p.m. but I sent word that I could not have the
translation ready before the later hour. Herr von Ribbentrop
was present, also Dr. Schmidt. Interview lasted one and a
quarter hour.
2. Her Hitler began by reading the German translation. (ready
before the later hour. Herr von Ribbentrop was) When he had
finished, I said that I wished to make certain observations....
3. Our word was our word, and we had never and would
never break it. In the old days Germany's word had the
same value, and I quoted a passage from a German book
(which Herr Hitler had read) about Marshal Blucher's
exhortation to his troops
[Page 36]
when hurrying to the support of Wellington at
Waterloo: "Forward, my children. I have given my
word to my brother Wellington, and you cannot wish
me to break it."
4. Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that
things were different 125 years ago.
-------
6. I told Herr Hitler that he must choose between England
and Poland. If he put forward immoderate demands there
was no hope of a peaceful solution. Corridor was inhabited
almost entirely by Poles. Herr Hitler interrupted me here by
observing that this was only true because a million Germans
have been drive out of that district since the war. I again said
the choice lay with him. He had offered a Corridor over the
Corridor in March, and I must honestly tell him that anything
more that that, if that, would have no hope of acceptance. I begged
him very earnestly to reflect before raising the price. He said his
original offer had been contemptuously and he would not
make it again. I observed that it had been made in the form
of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference.
7. Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could
never be reasonable: She had England and France
behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten
she would later recover, thanks to their help, more
than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland.
I said that reminded me of a similar talk last year of
annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were
incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. I said
that it was just because we remembered the experience
of Czecho-Solvakia last year that we hesitated to press
Poland too far today. Nevertheless, we reserved to
ourselves the right to form our own judgment as to
what was or what was not reasonable so far as Poland
or Germany were concerned. We kept our hands free
in that respect.
8. Generally speaking, Herr Hitler kept harping on
Poland, and I kept on just as consistently telling
Herr Hitler that he had to choose between friendship
with England which we offered to him and excessive
demands on Poland which would put to an end all
hope of British friendship. If we were to come to an
understanding it would entail sacrifices on our part.
If he was not prepared to make sacrifices on his part
there was nothing to be done. Herr Hitler said that
he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army
was ready and eager for battle, his people were united
behind him, and he would not tolerate further ill-treatment
of Germans in Poland, etc.
9. It is unnecessary to recall the details of a long and
earnest conversation in the course of which the only
occasion in which Herr Hitler became at all excited was
when I observed that it was not a question of Danzig
and the Corridor, but one of our determination to
resist force by force. This evoked
[Page 37]
a tirade about the Rhineland, Austria and Sudenten and
their peaceful reacquisition by Germany. He also resented
my reference to 15th March.
pp. 165-168
Following are additional points in amplification of my
telegram of 28th August:-- Telegram Sir Neville Henderson
to Viscount Halifax,
dated Berlin, August 29, 1939
Herr Hitler insisted that he was not bluffing, and that
people would make a great mistake if they believed that
he was. I replied that I was fully aware of the fact and that
we were not bluffing either. Herr Hitler stated that he fully
realized that that was not the case. In answer to a suggestion
by him that Great Britain might offer something at once in
the way of colonies as evidence of her good intentions, I
retorted that concessions were easier of realization in a
good rather than a bad atmosphere.
p.169
Telegram Sir Neville Henderson to Viscount Halifax
dated Berlin August 29, 1939.
Interview this evening was of a stormy character and
Herr Hitler far less reasonable than yesterday. Press
announcement this evening of five more Germans
killed in Poland and news of Polish mobilization had
obviously excited him.
2. He kept saying that he wanted British friendship more
than anything in the world, but he could not sacrifice Germany's
vital interests therefore, and that for His Majesty's Government
to make a bargain over such a matter was an unendurable
proposition. All my attempts to correct this complete
misrepresentation of the case did not seem to impress him.
p.179
Telegram Sir Neville Henderson to Viscount Halifax
dated Berlin August 30, 1939
Your message was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs at 4 a.m. this morning. I had made similar
observation to Herr Hitler yesterday evening, his reply
being that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in
one and a half hours.
4. Nevertheless if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue to
have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only be
either war or once again victory for him by a display of
force and encouragement thereby to pursue the same
course again next year or the year after.
p. 180-181
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Hitler Source Book
British War Blue Book
Telegrams: Sir Neville Henderson to Viscount Halifax
August 1939
Telegram Sir Neville Henderson to
Viscount Halifax
dated Berlin, August [unreadable], 1939.