Sixteenth Day:
Monday, 10th December, 1945
[Page 267]
MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this
copy of the Order.
THE PRESIDENT: By whom?
MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the
Order, which was the Naval War Staff.
For this purpose, the High Commands of the branches of the
Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous
manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German
war and combat experience, and for assistance in military
economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable,
but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations.
Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests
which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to
himself.
3. The harmonising of the operational plans of the two parties
is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
(b) The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ
strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this
connection every opportunity to support German mercantile
warfare must be exploited.
(c) The raw material situation of the Pact Powers demands
that Japan should acquire possession of those territories
which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially
if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be
carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war,
since they are of vital importance to Germany.
(d) The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in
the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire
conduct of war of the Three Powers. [Page 268]
A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet
be fixed.
4. In the Military Commissions to be formed in accordance with
the Three-Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with
as equally concern the three participating powers. These will
include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
The working out of the details is the responsibility of the
Main Commission, with the co-operation of the Armed Forces
High Command.
5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
'Barbarossa' operations."
If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution of this list, you
will see that it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed
Forces High Command, joint Operation Staff, Intelligence
Divisions, and to the Chief of Foreign Affairs, simultaneously for
Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read that the Nazi's cardinal
operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as
March, 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against
Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases. I shall pass over,
for the moment, other references to the United States in Basic
Order No. 24 and take that point up later.
I now wish to refer to our Document No. C-152, which has already
been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB 122. This
document is the top secret record of a meeting on 18th March,
1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24; a
meeting attended by Hitler, the defendant Raeder, the defendant
Keitel and the defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with
Paragraph 2 in this instance, where Raeder, then Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:-
Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against U.S.A. She can
do so if she takes Singapore as soon as possible." [Page 269]
I now turn to further efforts by the defendant Ribbentrop to
induce the Japanese to aggression against the British
Commonwealth. On 29th March, 1941, he met the Japanese Foreign
Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A report of their
conversations, found in the German Foreign Office archives, is
contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I now offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA 152.
Relevant portions of this document have been translated into
English. I shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English
translation:
He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He
(the R.A.M.) wanted to point out to Matsuoka that a conflict
with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any
case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon
his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was
impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such
a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
considered possible."
Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a low
estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the
view,
[Page 270]
The R.A.M. replied that America could not do anything against
Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps, for
this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding
on active measures against Japan; for, while on one hand he
could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand,
there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan.
For the American President, of course, this would mean a
considerable loss of prestige; and because of the inadequate
rearmament he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing
everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted
as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key
position of England in the East. Therefore it might be
possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to
be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not
be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in
order to reassure the British, but also in order to foot the
pro-British and pro-American elements until, one day, he would
suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were
based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against
Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one
blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the R.A.M. remarked.)
He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese
statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of
the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then the nation will
be united.' The Japanese needed to be shaken up to awaken.
After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would
come, whether you wanted it or not."
The R.A.M. replied that he had already discussed these
questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure
maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer - who probably
must be considered the greatest expert on military questions
at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of
attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare,
too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report,
based on their European experiences, for the Japanese, on the
use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity, against
the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would
be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.
[Page 271]
Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his,
were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval Forces would need
three months before they could capture Singapore. As a
cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He
believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from
America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore
required still more time, and if the operations should even
drag out for a year, the situation with America would become
extremely critical, and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East
Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack
in this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be
brought into operation again only after one or two years.
The R.A.M. added that Japan would gain decisive influence over
the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of
Singapore."
In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again
summarised the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan
with him from his trips-:
2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated in
the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in
the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
[Page 272]
I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances,
expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS, previously, that
if Japan entered the conflict she likewise had nothing to fear
from the Soviet Union. The references to the weaknesses of the
United States, scattered throughout the quotations I have read,
were also an ingredient in this brew which was being so carefully
prepared and brought to the boil.
I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the
case dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to
aggression against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document
1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 154. This document is a
top secret report, dated 24th May, 1941, from the German Military
Attache in Tokyo, to the Intelligence Division of the O.K.W. I
wish merely to call attention, at this point, to the last sentence
in Paragraph 1, wherein it is stated:-
Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the
U.S.S.R.
I invite the Tribunal's attention at this point, to the language
of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote,
beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page
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(Part 7 of 9)
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential
to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
available.
It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
(a) The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed
as forcing England to the ground quickly, thereby keeping
the United States out of the war. Beyond this, Germany has
no political, military, or economic interests in the Far
East which would give occasion for any reservations with
regard to Japanese intentions.
In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
naval power - extending to those of American naval power only
if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented - will result in
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole
English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this
action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese
officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to
land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her
efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has
Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the
U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines,
Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
The fact clearly appears, from these minutes, that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese, to discuss
the activation of Japanese military support against the British,
and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the
second sentence in Paragraph 2 of our Document C-152.
"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in
England."
"The R.A.M. (that is Ribbentrop) resumed the preceding
conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks
with the Russians, in Moscow, where they had left off. He
expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view
of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the
Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would
develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany
would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He
was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that
Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without
fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part
of the German Army was in any case on the Eastern frontiers of
the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
He (the R.A.M.), however, believed that Russia would try to
avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however,
enter into a conflict with Russia, the U.S.S.R. would be
finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had, of
course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted
to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain
from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
I now omit five pages of the German text and continue directly
with the English translation:-
"Next, the R.A.M. turned again to the Singapore question. In
view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible
attacks by submarines based on the Philippines, and of the
intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home Fleets, he
had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder.
The latter had stated that the British Navy, during this year,
would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in
the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a
single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had
described the U.S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not
bother about them at all.
I then omit part of the German text, and continue with what
appears in the English translation:-
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in
the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached
to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German
written promise of assistance.
On 5th April, about a week after the conference from whose minutes
I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met Matsuoka, and again
pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war.
The notes of this conference, which were also found in the German
Foreign Office Archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS,
which I now offer as Exhibit USA 153. I shall read a few brief
extracts from these notes, starting with the third paragraph on
Page 1 of the English translation.
"In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now
awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would
take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation,
the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of
course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as
the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of
the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
armament, and with the resignation from the League of
Nations."
I now omit several pages of the German text and continue with the
English translation.
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich
would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,
which in its time was the only dominant power on the European
Continent.
Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing
the same theme I have previously noted. Germany has already won
the war for all practical purposes. Japan's entry will hasten the
inevitable end. But Japan had better get the positions she wants
during the war.
1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this
year, the world would realise this. Even England would have
to concede it, if she had not collapsed before then, and
America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
"The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand."
I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however,
the fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that
the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese
Operational Plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators
had fostered.
"The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression
would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at
war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly,
the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a 'new order of
things.'"
The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with
particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We
now turn to their effort to induce the Japanese to commit a "stab
in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here
again, the defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.