Sixteenth Day:
Monday, 10th December, 1945
[Page 272]
In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on
29th March, 1941, almost three weeks after the issuance of Basic
Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come.
The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already
been introduced as Exhibit
[Page 273]
What conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in
April, 1941, can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed
their aggression against the U.S.S.R., in June, 1941, the tenor of
Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10th July, 1941,
he dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in
Tokyo. The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce
as Exhibit USA 155. I quote from Paragraph 4 of that telegram,
which is the first paragraph of the English translation:-
[Page 274]
I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into
the war against Russia, as soon as possible, especially using
arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists and friendly
business men. I believe that, according to military
preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The
greatest obstacle which I have to fight against is the
disunity among the activist group which, without unified
command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself
to the changed situation."
As a matter of background, I note that at this time German armies
were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R., and the fall of Sebastopol
had just been announced.
I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA 157, and I quote
the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation
thereof:-
He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, who was of
the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasise one point right
away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently
strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should
Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at
the half-way mark. We do not want to urge Japan into an action
that is not mutually profitable."
(A recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence
our Document 2954-PS, as Exhibit USA 158. This is a record of a
conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6th March,
1943.
I note again for background, that the strategic military situation
in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.
[Page 275]
You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argument
at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar
Japanese refrain of "So sorry, please", likewise appears to have
crept in.
I note in this record that the month of February, 1943, had also
seen the end of organised Japanese resistance on the Island of
Guadalcanal.
I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the
discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6th March, 1943, which
appear in the English translation in the document book.
The Japanese Government had the intention of becoming
aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
The R.A.M. brought up the question, after the explanation by
the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war was
envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany was waging the war
against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone,
while Japan was mostly behaving more defensively. However, it
would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three-
Power Pact should combine their forces to defeat not only
England and America, but also Russia. It was not good when one
part had to fight alone. One could not overstrain the German
national strength. He was inwardly concerned about certain
forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the opinion and
propagated it that, doubtless, Germany would emerge from the
battle victoriously, but that Japan should proceed to
consolidate her forces, before she further exerted herself to
the fullest extent." [Page 276]
The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against
the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel
in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of
preparations by the Nazis themselves for an attack from across the
Atlantic, and the other of fomenting war in the Pacific.
In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R.,
I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences
relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up
again in their relevant passages to show their particular
application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging
the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of
7th December and 11th December, 1941, when the Japanese and German
Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war
against the United States.
Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these
documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the
direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the
universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with
the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be
viewed in the focus of both their overall plan and their immediate
commitments elsewhere. That their overall plan involved ultimate
aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the
defendant Goering in a speech on 8th July, 1938, when these
conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were
perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia.
This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft
industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the
enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to
General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for
the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document R-140, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA 160.
I invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering
memorandum, that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes
of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which
Goering called for increased aircraft production and pointed to
the necessity for full mobilisation of German industrial capacity.
I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the
German text and Page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from
the second full paragraph on Page 11 of the English translation,
starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:-
[Page 277]
During the period of their preparation for and the waging of
aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign
against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these
conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war
at that time. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the
prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later
date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a
document which we have found in the files of the O.K.L., the
German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer
as Exhibit USA 161. This document is a memorandum marked
"Chefsache", the German designation for top secret, from a Major
von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe
General.
Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that
time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of
the O.K.W., which was the staff headed by the defendant Jodl. His
memorandum, which he characterises as a "brief resume on the
military questions current here", is dated 29th October, 1940. It
covers several questions. I shall quote to you numbered Paragraph
5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English
translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet
document.
(a)No other operational commitment.
A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
G.A.F." - or the German Air Force. [Page 278]
(1) In General:
The military domination of Europe, after the defeat of Russia,
will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably
reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of
the Army will allow, the armoured units will be greatly
increased.
Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
a direct connection with the conduct of the war against
England and, should the case arise, against America.
The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
which must be greatly increased in strength."
I now refer again to Basic Order No. 24, regarding collaboration
with Japan. This is Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit
USA 151. 1 have read it in its entirety into the record. The
Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on
5th March, 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3)
(a) as "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping
the United States out of the war."
Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within
the framework of that policy, the possibility of the United
States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were
then instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on
possessions of the United States, practically simultaneously with
the assault on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other
possibilities of involvement of the United States were also
discussed. This Basic Order No. 24 stated - and I am referring to
Subparagraph (3) W, on the top of Page 2 of the Document C-75:-
[
Previous |
Index |
Next ]
Home ·
Site Map ·
What's New? ·
Search
Nizkor
© The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012
This site is intended for educational purposes to teach about the Holocaust and
to combat hatred.
Any statements or excerpts found on this site are for educational purposes only.
As part of these educational purposes, Nizkor may
include on this website materials, such as excerpts from the writings of racists and antisemites. Far from approving these writings, Nizkor condemns them and
provides them so that its readers can learn the nature and extent of hate and antisemitic discourse. Nizkor urges the readers of these pages to condemn racist
and hate speech in all of its forms and manifestations.
(Part 8 of 9)
[MR. ALDERMAN continues]
"Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador
in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be
convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia,
this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as
in the past, full confidence in the Japanese policy, and in
the Japanese Foreign Minister; principally because the present
Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the
future of its nation if it did not take this unique
opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure
for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese
matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador
in Moscow, is, in effect, close to collapse, a report which
coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to
judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible
that Japan should not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the
Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are
completed."
Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of
the English translation, the sentence beginning "However".
"However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at
the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my
note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the
better. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan
join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter
starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of
the Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic
that the question of England's collapse or the total
destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be
a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of
the world would then be faced with our taking possession of
the remaining positions of the British Empire which are
important for the Three-Power-Pact countries. I have the
unshakeable conviction that a carrying through of the new
order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and that
there will be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries
of the Three-Power Pact stand close together and counter every
action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to
report in the near future, as often as possible and in detail,
on the political situation there."
"Telegram; Secret Cipher System. Sent 14th July from Tokyo;
arrived 14th July, 1941. Immediate.
On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to
induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall
present three documents covering July, 1942, and March and April,
1943. The first is our Document 2911-PS, which contains notes of a
discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to
Berlin, on 9th July, 1942.
"He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at
this time when the situation was as described, because now a
question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint
conduct of the war. If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong
militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably
now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at
this time, it would lead to her - Russia's - final moral
collapse; at least, it would hasten the collapse of her
present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such
an opportunity as then existed to eliminate once and for all
the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for ten minutes.
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram
from Tokyo, and he was to report by order of his Government to
the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The
suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the
subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government
and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was
discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result was
the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognised
the danger which threatened from Russia, and completely
understood the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her
part should also enter the war against Russia. However, it was
not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the
present war situation, to do so. It was rather of the
conviction that it would be in the common interest, not to
start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the
Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian
question.
I now omit several pages in the German text and resume the
quotation:
"Then the R.A.M. again brought up the question of the attack
on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight
on the Burma front as well as in the South was actually more
of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China
very few ground forces were stationed. Therefore, the attack
on Russia was primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself
if the necessary forces for that would be available."
"The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again
that, without any doubt, this year presented the most
favourable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough
and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to
attack Russia, who certainly would never again be as weak as
she was at the moment."
I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a
large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of
Americans in uniform all over the world.
"I still lack these rocket-motors, which could make such
flights possible, perfect bombers, capable of round trip
flights to New York with a 10-ton bomb load. I would be
extremely happy to possess such a bomber, which would at last
stuff the mouth of arrogance across the sea."
Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realisation
at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi
conspirators' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here
in the past several days.
"(5) The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of
the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the
prosecution of a war against America at a later date.
Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
Essential conditions are at present:
The Nazi's military interest in the United States is further
indicated by Paragraph 7, which I read:
(b) Portuguese neutrality.
(c) Support of France and Spain.
"General von Botticher has made repeated reference, especially
in his telegram 234, dated 26th October, to the fact that in
his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
aircraft industry are being published in the German Press. The
matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
pointed out that the matter was specifically a G.A.F. one, but
have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its
own merits."
Again, in July, 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting
from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the
Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for
the attack on the United States.
"By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32,
for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following
principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
supplies:
From these documents, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were
making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United
States. The Nazis overall plan with regard to the United States
was, however, a complex one, involving, in addition, collaboration
with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations
to the Japanese, to undertake an assault against British
possessions in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war
against the United States.
"(c) The raw material situation of the Pact Powers demands
that Japan should acquire possession of those territories
which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if
the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried
out, even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they
are of vital importance to Germany."
The Order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below
Subparagraph (3)(d):-
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
Naval power - extending to those of American naval power only
if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be
prevented - will result in weakening the enemy's system of
power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia)."