Supreme Court of Canada: 1992 Zündel Judgement
A. Trial
(1) Judicial Notice
At trial, Judge Thomas took judicial notice of the fact
that Jews were murdered by the Nazis but did not take judicial
notice of the facts alleged in the appellant's pamphlet:
The mass murder and extermination of Jews in Europe
by the Nazi regime during the Second World War is so
generally known and accepted that it could not
reasonably be questioned by reasonable persons. I
directed you then and I direct you now that you will
accept that as a fact. The Crown was not required to
prove it. It was in the light of that direction that
you should examine the evidence in this case and the
issues before you.
Accordingly, it was not open to the appellant to argue
that no Jews died during the Second World War, and indeed, as
noted above, this was not his thesis. In his final address to
the jury, defence counsel analyzed the relationship between the
judicial notice and the appellant's work:
His Honour will tell you what he says is reasonable
for reasonable men to contest. But it won't include
the six million, it won't include the gas chambers
and it won't include an official plan. That's
basically what this book is all about.
That is not to dispute the Jewish tragedy of
mass murder of some Jews by some Nazis during World
War II which His Honour will tell you is a fact. The
Judicial ruling goes no further than that. And if
two Jews were killed by some Nazis, that wouldn't be
a mass murder. It would certainly be a tragedy. It
would be wrong. But it wouldn't necessarily be what
is portrayed as the Holocaust. [Emphasis added.]
The appellant was fully able to defend the specific
allegations out of which he built his argument as to the
motive, intention, mechanisms, scope, and impact of the
slaughter. He was fully able to put forth his argument that
"the Holocaust", writ large as an historical icon, was a
fabrication. The court explicitly did not take away from the
jury the possibility of accepting evidence in support of
Zundel's fundamental premise that there was no systematic plan
of genocide and thus that racism was not as dangerous as
supposed. The trial judge also made it clear in his
instruction to the jury that they were to find that some Jews
died but must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these
deaths amounted to the historical cataclysm known as the
Holocaust. In his charge to the jury, Judge Thomas summarized
the position of the defence:
The publication considered in its essence puts
forward the thesis six million Jews were not killed
during the war, there was no official plan or policy
by the National Socialist regime of Adolf Hitler to
exterminate the Jews, and there were no homicidal gas
chambers.
(2) Elements of the Offence
Judge Thomas defined the elements of the offence which the
Crown had to prove as:
(a) wilful publication
(b) of a statement of fact rather than of opinion
(the onus of differentiating fact from opinion lying
with the Crown);
(c) which the accused knew to be false when he
published it; and
(d) which falsehood is likely to cause mischief to
the public interest (in this case, the interest in
racial and social tolerance).
(i) Wilful Publication
While the appellant conceded publication, the Crown
adduced the evidence of Sergeant Luby of the Metropolitan
Toronto Police that, in the course of investigating the
complaint against him, the appellant confirmed that he had
written the preface and conclusion, had published the amended
version of Richard Verral's work and had distributed it within
and beyond Canadian borders. Indeed, the afterward of the
pamphlet itself enumerates the appellant's distribution efforts
in Canada. The jury was instructed that, if they accepted the
evidence of the officer and admission by counsel for the
appellant, they could find that he had wilfully published it.
Judge Thomas noted that the date of publication was key in
determining the most important issue of knowledge of falsity at
publication date. The Crown had alleged that the publication
occurred in 1981. The trial judge summarized the evidence on
this point as suggesting that it was produced at some point
between early 1979 and Sgt. Luby's attendance at the
appellant's home on May 29, 1984.
(ii) Statement of Fact Rather than of Opinion
The appellant argued that the pamphlet was only an
expression of opinion and, in the alternative, that if found to
be an assertion of fact, it was verifiable as truth. Judge
Thomas held that the issue of whether the pamphlet conveyed an
assertion of fact or mere opinion was to be determined by the
jury. He pointed to the defence expert, Dr. Fann, who asserted
that a factual claim may be distinguished from an expression of
opinion by virtue of its capacity to be tested and verified,
while expressions of opinion are merely subjective and thus
cannot be proved or disproved. The defence expert Dr. Botting
had testified that the pamphlet was two thirds fact and one
third opinion but that he would characterize it as an
expression of opinion. The trial judge left it to the jury to
determine whether to accept this submission or to accept the
Crown's argument, paraphrased as:
Do you think his view was influenced by his
contention that there is no such thing as a fact,
that everything is opinion? The Crown asks, in the
real world, don't we have to distinguish between fact
and opinion on a daily basis?
The defence expert witness,
Mr. Felderer, a publisher of
Holocaust denial literature, also testified that the pamphlet
was important because it contained allegations of fact. Judge
Thomas instructed the jury:
Although there are individual items or passages
in the pamphlet which, considered separately might be
characterized as opinions, I direct you that it is
open to you to find that the pamphlet, considered as
a whole, asserted as a fact that Jews were not
exterminated as a result of government policy during
the Nazi regime, that the Holocaust did not occur and
it is an invention or a hoax to enable Israel and
Jews to collect huge reparation payments from
Germany.
It was left to the jury to consider whether the Crown had
satisfied them beyond a reasonable doubt of the verifiable
falsity of the factual assertions contained in the pamphlet and
whether the cumulative effect of these errors rendered the
pamphlet as a whole a false statement or tale.
(iii) Falsity of the Factual Allegations
The appellant's allegations of fact in the pamphlet were
divided into 85 extracts and rebutted one by one. The trial
judge summarized this material at length for the jury but it
will suffice here to point only to some of the more egregious
examples. The pamphlet alleged that a memorandum from
Joseph
Goebbels revealed that the Final Solution was never more than a
plan to
evacuate Jews to Madagascar. It was shown that there
was no such memorandum but that the reference was to Goebbels'
diary entry of March 7, 1942. This diary extract was adduced
and shown to state nothing of the kind. The Crown went on to
point out that the entry for March 27, 1942 made clear that the
Final Solution was, in fact, genocide:
Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole, it
can be said that about 60 per cent of them will have
to be liquidated, whereas only about 40 per cent can
be used for forced labor....
The pamphlet alleges that no documentary evidence exists
of the Nazi plan to exterminate the Jews. The Crown adduced
speeches by Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, made on October
4, 1943 to his troops in Posen in which he refers to the
program of extermination of the Jews. Himmler stated:
I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a
very grave matter. Among ourselves it should be
mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will never speak
of it publicly....
I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the
extermination of the Jewish race....
The appellant argued that the term "exterminate" used in this
passage really meant "deport". It was left to the jury to
consider whether they accepted that this was a possible
interpretation.
The Crown also adduced the December 9, 1942 entry in the
diary of
Hans Frank, SS officer in charge of Poland, describing
the annihilation of 3.5 million Jews in the general government
and numerous documents adduced at the Nuremberg trials,
including the daily reports of the
Einsatzgruppen (action
groups) enumerating the death tolls of Jews in the USSR. In a
report to Hitler of December 20, 1942, Himmler indicates that
the Einsatzgruppen had executed 363, 211 Jews between August
and November, 1942.
The pamphlet alleged, purportedly relying on a Red Cross
report, that all concentration camps were really humane work
camps. Mr. Biedermann, a delegate of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, testified that the Red Cross Report
pertained exclusively to prisoner of war camps as the Red Cross
personnel had not been inside any camps in which civilians were
detained. The Crown adduced evidence from Professor Hilberg
that while some camps had labour facilities annexed to them,
Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor and Chelmno were exclusively
"killing factories" and that gas chambers were in operation at
Auschwitz-Birkenau and Majdanek. The numbers of Jews
slaughtered was verifiable from railway records showing the
payments per person made by the Gestapo for transport to the
camps. These numbers were compared with those having left the
camps or who were found there after liberation.
On and on, the Crown showed that the appellant
misrepresented the work of historians, misquoted witnesses,
fabricated evidence, and cited non-existent authorities.
(iv) Appellant's Knowledge of Falsity
The trial judge made it clear that this was the most
important element of the offence and that the onus lay on the
Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
knew that these assertions of fact were false when he published
them. The Crown alleged publication in 1981. Evidence was
heard from defence witnesses that the appellant was extremely
familiar with the history of the Holocaust and that he was
aware of the overwhelming evidence produced by orthodox
Holocaust historians that the Holocaust did occur.
The Crown adduced evidence that the appellant was
committed to white supremacist and anti-Semitic causes and was
a fan of Adolph Hitler and of the Nazi regime. The Crown
adduced a radio interview with the CBC and two pamphlets
allegedly written and distributed by the appellant under his
pen name, Christof Friedrich (his middle names), entitled The
Hitler We Loved and Why and UFO's: Nazi Secret Weapon. It was
open to the jury to find that evidence of motive drawn from
these materials was relevant to knowledge of falsity. Judge
Thomas stated:
It is true that the accused man is not on trial
for his beliefs, and he is not on trial for
publishing Exhibits 2 and 3. However, it is open to
you to find that if the accused believed in National
Socialism, it is open to you to conclude that he
knowingly would publish falsehoods to foster and
protect those beliefs. In other words, that is the
limited use that you can make of Exhibits 2, 3 and 5
combined.
Sgt. Luby testified that the appellant stated to him that
he had been writing "those things" for twenty-five years.
Defence witnesses who shared the appellant's views testified
that, as far as back as 1969, the appellant had believed the
Holocaust was a myth. Mr. Smith, a representative from the
"revisionist history" group, the Institute for Historical
Review, and Mr. Faurisson, a "revisionist historian" convicted
on charges arising out of his Holocaust denial publications in
France, testified that in 1979, the appellant attended a
conference of the Institute in which participants undertook to
launch a campaign against the Holocaust. Mr. Walendy, another
participant at the Conference, testified that he discussed the
pamphlet with the appellant at that time and made him aware of
objections and criticisms levelled against the publication
elsewhere. It was left to the jury to conclude whether the
appellant had no knowledge of the falsity of the materials or
whether, despite the fact that he knew they were false, he was
prepared to publish falsehoods in order to win converts to his
cause.
Judge Thomas instructed the jury that while the
unreasonableness of the appellant's belief was a relevant
factor in determining whether he truly held such a belief, it
was by no means conclusive of the matter. Consistent with the
jurisprudence of this Court on the role of unreasonableness of
beliefs in, for example, the defence of mistake of fact, in
Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, at p. 156, Judge
Thomas stated that:
If you find that the accused honestly believed that
the pamphlet was true, or you are left with a
reasonable doubt on this point, you must acquit.
Now, it is not necessary for that belief, held
honestly, to be reasonable. The unreasonable nature
of the belief is only one factor to be considered.
In other words, it is only one item of the evidence
to support an inference that the belief is not
honestly held.
(v) Mischief to a Public Interest
The public interest identified was racial and social
tolerance. The Crown argued that an attack on one segment of
society harmed all of society. The trial judge told the jury
that they had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the publication of Did Six Million Really Die? was a threat to
this interest. The Crown submitted that the pamphlet fostered
hatred and contempt for Jews. It did so insidiously because it
disguised itself as an academic work, relying upon appeals to
authority. It did so in a particularly vicious manner because
the objects of the fabrication are themselves characterized as
diabolical liars such that their attempts to clarify and rebut
the allegations would not be believed. Perhaps most
importantly, the Crown alleged that the pamphlet makes
tolerance for religious minorities "a dirty word" and the game
of dupes.
The appellant submitted that no harm had been proved to
have resulted from the publication and that public debate of
provocative views enhanced social and racial tolerance. He
submitted that it was an insult to Canadians to suggest that
they were not capable of discerning truth from falsity. The
trial judge instructed the jury that deliberate lies were not
protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter but left the final issue of
harm to the jury as well. They returned with a verdict of
guilty.
B. Ontario Court of Appeal No. 1 (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97
Although this is an appeal from the second trial, it is
useful to note briefly the fate of the appellant on his first
appearance before the Ontario Court of Appeal. In a decision
rendered on behalf of the full court, the Ontario Court of
Appeal affirmed the essential elements of the offence as they
were described by the trial judge at the second trial and set
out earlier.
The decision was rendered quite early in the development
of Charter jurisprudence and the court noted that there was
little precedent to guide them. They addressed themselves to
the proper scope of the right under s. 2(b) and concluded that
deliberate lies likely to produce racial and social intolerance
did not fall within its embrace.
In doing this, they placed great reliance on the United
States approach to defining a limit to freedom of expression
which excludes obscene, libellous and knowingly false speech.
After considering the various justifications provided in the
American jurisprudence for limiting expression, they concluded
(at pp. 123-24):
Spreading falsehoods knowingly is the antithesis of
seeking truth through the free exchange of ideas. It
would appear to have no social or moral value which
would merit constitutional protection. Nor would it
aid the working of parliamentary democracy or further
self-fulfilment. In our opinion an offence falling
within the ambit of s. 177 [now s. 181] lies within
the permissibly regulated area which is not
constitutionally protected. It does not come within
the residue which comprises freedom of expression
guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter.
After assuming for the sake of argument that they were
wrong and the provision was a violation of s. 2(b), the Court
of Appeal considered the presence in the Criminal Code of
Canada and those of other commonwealth jurisdictions of the
offence of defamatory libel in determining that the section was
important and demonstrably justified in free and democratic
societies. They thus found the provision to be justified under
s. 1.
The court then considered the appellant's submission that
the provision was unconstitutional because it violated s. 7 by
being void for vagueness or overbreadth. The court considered
that the only element of the offence in s. 177 (now s. 181)
open to challenge was the category of "public interests" to
which injury might accrue. They considered that criminal law
is always aimed at preserving some public interest and found
that the preservation of racial harmony was certainly such an
interest. They therefore found no violation of s. 7.
However, the Court of Appeal went on to find that some of
the appellant's objections to the conduct of the trial judge
did have merit. They found these technical errors too numerous
to justify the exercise of s. 686(1)(b)(iii) and ordered the
new trial which was referred to earlier.
C. Ontario Court of Appeal No. 2 (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 161
The appellant appealed this second conviction, raising 47
grounds of appeal, most of which were found to be utterly
without merit and were not dealt with. The Court did consider
the issues of judicial notice, various elements of the charge
to the jury, admissibility of evidence read into the record,
questioning of the appellant about his belief in Nazi policies,
and production of his other anti-Semitic publications. The
Court of Appeal considered at length allegations of actual and
apparent bias in the trial judge and rejected them. The only
finding which has relevance to the constitutional issue in this
appeal is the court's approval at p. 196 of the trial judge's
characterization of the promotion of racism as a practice
contrary to a public interest.
[I]t is not in the public interest to have one
segment of the community racially or religiously
intolerant against another segment of the community.
An attack on one segment of the community is, in
reality, an attack on the whole community. If one
segment is not protected from criminal defamation and
libel, accusations of criminal wrongdoing, criminal
fraud, the whole community is vulnerable because the
next segment is fair game, and then the next segment
is fair game, until you have destroyed the entire
community.
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II. JUDGMENTS BELOW